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Scrapping policy induces or forces firms to dismantle and dispose of “excessive” machines, 
and was a typical policy tool for depressed or declining industries in postwar Japan. This 
paper examines the effects of this policy on the Japanese spinning industry from 1965-79 
using firm-level data. After clarifying features in the policy scheme, I first calculated the 
productivity and (capital) profitability of a specified machine targeted by the scrapping policy 
by estimating the production function with data from the production stage. Then, several 
forms of (dis)investment functions were estimated to examine the direct effect on investment 
under policy implementation and the indirect effect on post-policy investment through the 
firm’s revelation of the expected long-term return on investment. The former effect crucially 
depended upon whether scrapping was compulsory or voluntary, as well as on the coverage 
of targeted machines. Compulsory scrapping distorted a firm’s investment decisions more 
than voluntary scrapping. Regarding the latter effect, firms picked up by voluntary scrapping 
in a certain period were shown to be losers still investing less or disinvesting in the post-
treatment period. Firm exits also had a certain role in cutting down the unprofitable machines. 
Distortions by another related policy (a scrap-and-build constraint on investment) was also 
observed. As a result, this skillfully-designed policy scheme was, on the whole, far from a 
welfare-enhancing scheme. 
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1. Introduction 
Almost all industries face or will face the possibility of decline in the long run. This 
problem has been more than just one in particular periods for many developed countries. 
In the case of postwar Japan, stagnation or decline of specific industries often became 
the subject of heated policy debates. Examples include coal mining during heavy 
chemical industrialization and energy conversion since the late 1950’s, and shipbuilding 
and textiles during trade and capital liberalization since the early 1960’s. 
This paper focuses on the Japanese spinning industry in 1965-1979, and examines 
the effects of scrapping policies using firm level data. The spinning industry belongs to 
the textile industry, which was a typical example of depressed or declining industries 
during the period. Scrapping of production facilities was one of the typical policy tools 
used in the textile industry and, in the spinning industry, it was implemented three times 
(1968-69, 1972-73, and 1978-79) with a different backgrounds and schemes respectively. 
There has been a large body of literature on industrial policies of Japan toward 
depressed or declining industries during this period, along with related public policies1. 
The overall picture of such policies can be characterized by at least the following features. 
First, as a whole, the policy targets were mainly not high growth but low growth or 
declining industries. Beason and Weinstein (1996) examined the effects of industrial 
policy on industry level TFP growth and found that many of the policy measures were 
used to aid low growth or declining sectors.  
Secondly, however, evaluations of each policy measure are often ambiguous and 
different among researchers. The main reason is simple in that there were competing 
powers between measures. While one measure was used to recover the industry’s 
competitiveness or simply mitigate economic deterioration and social instability in the 
particular industry or regions, other measures were also implemented at the same time 
to facilitate shifts of economic resources from the industry to other industries. Then both 
cancelled out each other, and the effect of the policy highly depended upon other policies. 
The same can be said of scrapping policy in Japanese textile industry. For example, 
Yonezawa (1981) examined industrial policies toward the textile industry mainly based 
on the industry level performance indices, and suggested that scrapping policy in 1968-
69 could not resolve excess capacities in the spinning industry, due to the opposite effect 
                                                  
1 As for basic reference to general policy framework, see Komiya et al. (1988), Peck et al. 
(1987), Sekiguchi and Horiuchi (1988), MITI (1993), and Tan and Shimada (1994). For 
textile industry, basic references are,Yonezawa (1978, 1981), Yamazawa (1981, 1988), 
Watanabe (2010), MITI et al. (1977) and MITI (1984) on textile and clothing; JSA (1962, 
1969, 1979) on spinning; Horiuchi (1985) on synthetic fibers. Such experiences have been 
often cited in reports on industrial policy (Noland and Pack, 2003). 
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of other policies and the lack of market competition. On the other hand, Peck et al. (1987) 
examined the degree of achievement in the target industries in the late 1970’s scrapping 
policy and pointed out that inefficiency due to disposal of production facilities could be 
small in two spinning industries, where many small firms exited by “picking losers,” 
according to their own words. 
  Finally, although some previous studies examined the function and effect of policy 
theoretically, and others offered empirically based policy evaluation on industry level’s 
performance indices, such as profitability, firm size and distribution, market shares, and 
evolution of entries and exits, there are still relatively few micro-econometric studies 
using firm or plant data, especially on scrapping policy2. The purpose of this paper is to 
fulfill the gap in this research strand. 
  In another close, but different stream of micro-econometric studies of policies on the 
Japanese spinning industry, studies most related to this paper are Okazaki and Korenaga 
(1999a, 1999b) and Kiyota and Okazaki (2010). Since the early 1950’s, this industry had 
been controlled by a set of policy tools skillfully designed for specific purposes. The 
former two studies examined the determinants and effects of foreign exchange allocation 
policy under import control in the 1950’s wool spinning industry. The latter study focused 
on anticompetitive output control policy through restriction of machine use under the 
registration system for production facilities in 1955-64 cotton spinning industry, and 
examined its effect on the industry and firm productivity. The common interests across 
these studies are to examine the effects of policy, and then offer some evidence on 
features in its institutional framework such as government capability to policy making and 
implementation, or the coordination between government and firms. In this context, this 
paper focuses on anticompetitive output control policy under a different scheme in the 
late 1960’s, which is next to the scheme studied by Kiyota and Okazaki (2010), and the 
liberalization period after the abolition of the registration system in 1970, sharing similar 
interests with them. 
In making a research design, I started investigating the features in the policy scheme. 
Firstly, in relation with the Anti-monopoly law, scrapping policies in the spinning industry 
during that period, as a whole, were positioned along the extended line of anticompetitive 
output control policies. The product markets the industry faces are fairly competitive 
                                                  
2 The remarkable exception is Okazaki studies in the official history of MITI (2012). He 
examined policy effects of several temporary laws that were enacted since the late 1970’s 
to assist the specified industries, regions or firms, and obtained positive evaluation in many 
cases. Among them, the effects of the 1978 law are also covered in this paper. But the 
performance variables he used were ROA, TFP growth rate and labor productivity, and the 
results were based on the estimated coefficient of industry level dummy. So direct 
comparison to this paper is impossible. 
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because (i) there are many firms, (ii) the product, which is spun yarn, is basically 
homogeneous, and (iii) trade policies are relatively open, which made it difficult for firms 
to sustain collusive behavior. Since scrapping is a negative investment or disinvestment 
for production facilities, and its production capacity is the upper bound of output, 
scrapping means decreasing the long-term output. The coordination between firms and 
government authority also occurred in the process of policymaking and implementation. 
  Second, however, firms’ behaviors under the policy were characterized by the specific 
rules of policy, and difficulty in making strategic relationships among many firms. This 
was not what we can expect from the phrase “cartel” and “collective action.” The 
timetable for players can be sketched as follows. At first, the government tries to pick up 
firms by setting the purchasing price for scrapped machine and several requirements 
(compulsory or voluntary; with or without penalties to violators; who pays the expenses). 
Next, each firm observes the purchasing price, calculates the expected long-term return 
on investment from the subsequent periods along with other factors, compares it with the 
price, and then chooses the amount of machine scrapped. 
The weak degree of strategic relationship between firms also enables us to use a less 
complicated analytical framework and to narrow down the key factors taken into 
consideration. Although it is well known that the long-term decision on investment under 
incomplete information in dynamic oligopoly could make multiple equilibrium paths 
depending upon the firms’ strategies, if we can assume the absence of strategic 
relationship, the remaining key factors for investment decision are financial costs and the 
expected long-term return on investment, which further depend upon fundamentals, such 
as production costs and the overall evolution of the product market. 
Lastly, other kinds of policy tools were also implemented along with scrapping policy. 
The government started offering tax incentives and financial assistance for 
modernization and rationalization of production activities in the late 1960”s, which could 
potentially change a firm’s productivity. A specific type of constraint on investment was 
also imposed during the late 1960’s. It was called scrap-and-build rule, and forced a firm 
to scrap suspended machines in return for permission to install new machines. Moreover, 
another type of anti-competitive policy, the short-term suspension of machine, was 
intermittently implemented under the government-approved cartel, which was called the 
recession cartel. 
  Given the above evidence on policy scheme, this paper focuses on the following 
research questions. The first question is on the direct effects of scrapping policy: What 
type of firm scraps more machines under the policy? In other words, how is a firm’s 
(dis)investment decision under the policy different from that without the policy? The 
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second question is on the indirect policy effect: How does a firm having scrapped more 
change their performance in the post-policy period? Specifically, is a firm picked up by 
policy actually a loser in the post-policy period? 
As for identification of such policy effects, the following analytical frameworks are 
employed. First, this paper will take the approach of modeling a firm’s investment 
decision. The first merit of this approach is that a firm profit maximization problem under 
scrapping policy can give theory-based parameter restrictions on the estimated equation. 
Another merit is that the scrap-and-build constraint can be treated explicitly in the 
estimated equation by parameterizing the Lagrange multiplier. The effect of the recession 
cartel is also adjusted. 
Second, departing from Tobin’s Q theory, this paper employs investment function with 
adjustment cost, and uses as capital profitability the short-term return on investment to 
a specific machine, which is the spinning machine that was designated as the policy 
target. Third, the production function is also estimated using data on spinning production 
stage, by which the short-term return on investment to the spinning machine can be 
estimated as marginal product of the machine. The merit of this approach is that we can 
directly examine the relationship between scrapping and the marginal returns of the last 
and possible excessive one unit of the machine, while empirically we often can only use 
the firm-level average Q instead of the marginal Q. It can be also suggested that using 
firm-level profitability could get less appropriate in declining or matured industries where 
firms diversify their business to other fields. Another merit of estimating production 
function is that we can capture the effects of other policies affecting firm productivity. 
Fourth, since the common policy variable is not available in the whole period, I split it 
into sub-periods and estimated investment function in the form of a saturated model with 
policy-implementation year dummies to measure treatment effect. 
Finally, to examine the indirect policy effect of voluntary scrapping scheme in a certain 
period, I also use, as the indicator of the expected long-term return on investment, the 
presence or absence of a firm’s participation in this policy scheme, along with the short-
term return noted above. The hypothesis is that joining voluntary scrapping scheme was 
the revelation of the expected long-term return on investment because more profitable 
firms are less likely to join this policy. If this is true, this policy variable negatively 
correlates with the investment rate in the subsequent period, which implies that a firm 
picked up by policy is actually a loser in the post-policy period. 
  The composition of this paper is as follows. In the next section, I provide an overview 
of the scheme of scrapping policies, and clarify their features based on previous studies 
and primary documents. In section 3, after a panel estimation of production function, I 
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measure the industry’s productivity change and capital profitability, and discuss the scale 
of incentives offered by policy. In section 4, I firstly examine direct effects on investment 
behaviors under the policy by panel estimation. Then, in a case of voluntary scrapping 
in 1968-69, the indirect effects of the policy on post-policy investment behaviors are also 
examined. Appendices for data and theoretical model of investment function are at the 
end of the paper. 
 
 
2. Overview of the industry and the policy scheme for scrapping 
The Japanese cotton spinning industry had once attained global competitive edges in 
the prewar era (Odagiri and Goto, 1996)3. After compulsory shrinking during World War 
II, the industry restarted with a few incumbents called Judaibo (Ten Large Spinners) and 
the subsequent two groups of new entrants called Shinbo (New Spinners) and 
Shinshinbo (New-New Spinners), respectively. The industry experienced restoration 
under government control of material imports and production facility use since the early 
1950s4. The direct control of production facility use was implemented under the Sen’i 
kogyo setsubi rinji sochi ho (Old Law on Temporary Measures for Textile Industry 
Equipment; enacted in 1956 and amended in 1960; hereafter the Old Textile Law). The 
law introduced the registration system for production facilities, and also provided a 
couple of measures for its use, which were the short-term and the long-term production 
adjustments through the suspension of machines (JSA, 1962, p.67-94). Kiyota and 
Okazaki (2010) showed that this anticompetitive output control policy constrained the 
reallocation of resource, resulting in negative productivity growth in the industry. 
 In the 1960’s, the industry gradually lost its competitive advantage and was often hit 
by the depression, facing import increases from developing countries, while the overall 
wage rose due to other industries’ progress. Meanwhile, government control was 
deregulated in a stepwise manner. Control of material imports was abolished in 1961 but 
the scheme for control of production facilities use was revised in the mid-1960’s, and 
remained until June 1970. Table 1 shows the evolution of outputs and inputs of firms in 
                                                  
3 The spinning industry is mainly engaged in the process of drawing out and twisting yarn 
from staple of fibers by a spindle, and usually classified into cotton spinning, wool spinning, 
hemp spinning, chemical and synthetic fiber spinning, and so on. (The Textile Machinery 
Society of Japan, 1987). Hereafter, I mainly review the cotton spinning industry. Those firms 
were originally engaged in cotton spinning but launched into staple rayon spinning and then 
synthetic fiber spinning since the 1950”s. 
4 Since the Japanese yen had lost its convertibility until the late 1950’s, the government 
controlled the imports of almost all item through the foreign exchange allocation. As for 
textile material import, see Korenaga (2000) for cotton spinning and Okazaki and Korenaga 
(1999) for wool spinning. 
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the Japan Spinner Association (hereafter, JSA)5. The evolution of production facilities is 
also depicted in Figure 2. In the mid-1970’s, the industry entered a declining stage, which 
was triggered by rapid appreciation of the yen due to the transition into the floating 
exchange-rate system. In addition, a steep rise in energy prices was triggered by the first 
oil crisis. 
  During 1965-79 covered in this paper, a various form of policy assistance were 
implemented under gradual liberalization of the textile trade (Yonezawa, 1981; 
Yamazawa, 1988). Those policies were sometimes called structural adjustment policy or 
adjustment assistance policy. As a whole, the central policy goals changed around the 
mid-1970’s. Until the early 1970’s, both strengthening international competitiveness and 
facilitating shifts of economic resources to other industries were pursued. After the mid-
1970’s, the emphasis gradually shifted to the latter goal. Scrapping of production facilities 
had been one of the main policy measures throughout the whole period, and the spinning 
industry implemented this type of policies three times (1968-69, 1972-73, and 1978-79) 
for the different backgrounds. 
 
Scrapping policy in 1968-69 
In a case of 1968-69, the scrapping scheme was introduced by the enactment of the 
law in 1967 to solve the problem, which remained an issue with the existing policy 
measures. In 1964, the Old Textile Law was replaced by the Sen’i kogyo setsubi rinji 
sochi ho (New Law on Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment (enacted in 
1964 and extended to 1970; hereafter, New Textile Law). This law was proposed as a 
step toward deregulation of the spinning industry (JSA, 1979, p.57-64). First, the clause 
on the short-term production adjustment was deleted and thereafter replaced by the 
recession cartels approved by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission. Second, the 
suspension of the textile machines, which was used as the long-term production 
adjustment, was directed only one time (in December 1964) right after the enforcement 
of law. Third, the law prescribed that the registration system for production facilities would 
be abolished in September 1967 (extended to June 1970 after its 1967 revision). Fourth, 
the so-called scrap-and-build (open) clause was added (hereafter, S & B). This rule was 
a kind of constraint on investment, and allowed firms having disposed of suspended 
machines to install new machines (or return remaining suspended ones to an operable 
state) up to half the value of disposed machines. 
The amount of operable equipment increased in 1965 due to the S & B rule, which had 
                                                  
5 JSA was one of the major trade associations that made up a significant part of the cotton, 
rayon and synthetic fiber spinning industry, as explained later. 
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the potential to increase yarn production. The cotton spinning industry started the 
recession cartel in December 1965 and extended it several times (Oct. 1965 - Mar. 1966, 
Apr. 1966 - Dec. 1966, Jan. 1967 - Jun. 1967 (stopped in Mar. 1967)). The S & B clause 
was temporarily discontinued under the cartel (JSA, 1979, p.242). 
In 1967, the Tokutei sen’i kogyo kozo kaizen rinji sochi ho (Law on Temporary 
Measures for Structural Improvement of Specified Textile Industry; hereafter the 1967 
law) was enacted and scrapping proceeded under this law6. First, firms holding certain 
type of spinning machines, which had been registered as the first segment (cotton, rayon, 
or synthetic fiber spinning) in the registration system under the New Textile Law, were 
designated as the Tokutei boseki gyo (Specified Spinning Industry). Second, the 1967 
law prescribed the formulation of the Basic Plan for the [Old] Structural Improvement in 
the designated industries. This plan called for the disposal of excess capacities, along 
with tax incentives and financial assistance for modernization of equipment and 
rationalization of firm size. Third, the Sen’i kogyo kozo kaizen jigyo kyokai (Textile 
Industry Restructuring Agency; TIRA) was launched in 1967 to be in charge of operation 
in the above plan, and was co-funded by the government and the industry. 
Then, under concerted actions directed by the Minister of International Trade and 
Industry, disposing of specified spinning machines, including suspended ones (the 
coverage of which was almost the same as the first segments in the New Textile Law just 
mentioned above, with some exceptions) was implemented from October 1968 until 
March 1969. JSA and 2 other trade associations participated in this action. JSA’s shares 
was 53.7% (131 of 244) in the number of firms, but accounted for 90.2 % (= 
9,760,117/10,824,104) in the number of targeted spinning machines. 
The rules in the scheme were documented by MITI and the industry and can be 
summarized as follows (JSA, 1969, p.51-63, 74-82, 90-93). 
 
(1) Compulsory disposal by all participants 
6.35% of the number of specified spinning machines, which each participant has and 
which has been registered as of 10th August 1968, are compulsory disposed of on a pro 
rata basis over firm’s size. The planned goal is about 600,000 spindles. TIRA purchases 
the disposed machines and the purchasing price per spindle is 3,000 yen for an operable 
                                                  
6 In the process of making the 1967 law, coordination between the government and firms 
occurred. In 1965, JSA released a report titled Nihon sen’i sangyo no shorai to kokyu 
taisaku (The future and permanent measures in Japanese textile industry) and requested a 
policy scheme for disposal of machines as a permanent measure for stabilizing the balance 
between demand and supply. When the Textile Industry Council in MITI started discussions 
at the end of that year, the above JSA report was used as a basis for discussion (JSA 1979, 
p.98). Korenaga (2002) reviewed the roles of JSA in the coordination process during the 
late 1960’s and 1970’s using JSA documents. 
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machine (or 1,000 yen for a suspended one) plus the resale value as scraps. 
(2) Voluntary disposal by JSA firms 
In addition to measures listed above, JSA make an appeal for voluntary disposal to only 
JSA companies. The planned goal is about 400,000 spindles. TIRA purchases operable or 
suspended machines as well, but JSA gives incentive of 2,000 yen to its members, so the 
purchasing price per spindle is raised to 5,000 yen for an operable one (or 3,000 yen for a 
suspended one) plus the resale value as scraps7. 
(3) Disposal by exiting firms 
TIRA also purchases machines from firms planning to exit from the specified textile 
industries. The purchase price per spindle is 6,000 yen for an operable one (or 2,000 yen 
per spindle for a suspended one) plus the resale value as scraps. 
(4) Penalties on deviators from the concerted actions 
  Penalties of 1,000 or 3,000 yen per spindle, or 50,000 yen per case are charged to 
deviators from the concerted actions. 
(5) The expenses 
The expenses for compulsory disposal are financed by bank loan through TIRA and then 
TIRA collects 289.5 yen per spindle from incumbent participants on a pro rata basis. The 
same expenses apply for voluntary disposal, but the additional incentives are incurred by 
the incumbent JSA firms and they pay additional 39 yen per spindle on a pro rata basis. As 
for disposal by exiting firms, half of the expenses is subsidized by the government and TIRA 
collects the other half (1.05 yen per spindle) from incumbent participants on a pro rata basis. 
Pro rata was over the number of the remaining machines in all cases. 
 
The actual achievements were 850,160 spindles in total, 7.9% of the target spinning 
machines, of which 671,117 (595,705) were by compulsory disposal, 175,823 (163,659) 
by incumbents’ voluntary disposal, and 3,220 by exits (the operable marked in the 
parentheses). The JSA‘s achievements were 797,578 (719,692) spindles in total, where 
621,949 (556,497) were by compulsory disposal, 175,629 (163,465) by voluntary 
disposal, and 0 by exits. The JSA’s participants in compulsory and voluntary disposal 
were 101 and 66 firms. 
Since the primary documents do not give us precise information on the incentives 
offered by the policy, I built a model of a firm’s investment decision in Appendix 2. Then, 
the following six points list the features in the above scheme. First, the 1967 law gave 
firms new monetary incentive to scrap spinning machines, while the existing S & B 
constraint granted firms disposing the suspended machines a simple permission to 
increase the amount of operable machines. Moreover, at least theoretically, S & B 
constraint could force a firm with high return on investment to cut down the suspended 
machines (Appendix 2). 
Second, although the policy seemed to make a more profitable firm scrap less by naive 
                                                  
7 A couple of non-JSA firms also voluntarily scrapped a very small amount of operable 
machines, but its subtotal was only 167 spindles. 
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conjecture, the possible pattern of scrapping has more variety than expected, due to the 
following couple of incentives offered by the policy (Appendix 2). The one incentive is 
that because of higher purchasing price for an operable machine, voluntary disposal is 
always preferred to a compulsory one although a firm is required to join the latter scheme. 
The other incentive is that under nonlinear pricing to different states of machines in each 
scheme, a slight change in the difference between the relative purchasing price of the 
operable one to the suspended one, and its relative opportunity cost (that is, the relative 
return on investment) can switch the priority order among two states of machines a firm 
scraps in each scheme. 
Third, while penalties for deviators were provided, the coordination to make the rule 
enforceable for participants also occurred. Before the concerted actions for disposal 
were directed, JSA had several meetings with other textile trade associations to reach 
an agreement on the coverage of machines in compulsory disposal and to persuade 
opponents (JSA, 1969, p.47-51)8. This suggests that there existed a trade-off between 
enforceability and effectiveness in policy implementation. Fourth, the voluntary disposal 
offered by JSA could simultaneously give firms the opportunity to consider their long-
term return on investment in comparison to the purchasing prices. The scale of incentive 
will be examined in section 3.  
Fifth, however, it is not clear whether the scrapping enhanced economic welfare, 
although we can point out several positive factors that the purchasing price could act as 
the opportunity cost in the presence of the sunk cost of spinning machine and that an 
improvement of balance between supply and demand could raise its utilization rate. 
Lastly, policy measures for modernization and rationalization in the Structural 
Improvement Plan could have the opposite effects against the disposal9. So we should 
care about the overall policy implication for economic welfare. Productivity changes could 
also happen during the period, which will be examined in section 3. 
 
Scrapping policy in 1972-73 
  In a case of 1972-73, scrapping of production facilities for textiles was proceeded as 
one of the Temporary Special Measures for the Textile Industry, which were offered to 
                                                  
8 The other coordination was that MITI and TIRA allowed a firm to be exempt from 
compulsory disposal if another firm scrapped the same amount of machine in their 
agreement instead (JSA, 1969, p.64-66). 
9 While it was said that the program achieve certain progress with sufficient financial 
supports (MITI et al., 1977; JSA, 1979), Yonezawa (1981) suggested that, due to the 
opposite effect and the lack of market competition, excess capacities were not resolved 
fundamentally under scrapping in 1968-69. Policy assistance for laid-off workers was also 
introduced under the 1967 law, but not effective due to the low benefit (Yonezawa, 1978). 
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compensate for the loss the industry could incur from exports control in Japan-US textile 
negotiations (JSA, 1979, 142-51). The negotiation started in the mid-1950s, but trade 
friction got intensified in the late 1960s. The Japanese textile industry, led by 22 trade 
associations including JSA, collectively made an appeal against imports control by the 
U.S., and started to voluntarily restrain exports to the U.S. in July 1971. But eventually, 
Japan- US agreement on trade of textile products was signed in January 1972. 
The Japanese government approved budgets to compensate for both the voluntary 
export restraints and the Japan-US agreement during 1971. MITI announced the 
implementation outline of the above measures in January 1972. The measures for the 
spinning industry consisted of (1) purchases of “excessive” production facilities, (2) 
financial assistance, including long-term loans for working capital and credit guarantees, 
and (3) funds for a structural improvement program. Then, disposal was implemented 
from December 1972 till November 1973. 
The rules in the scheme were documented by MITI and the industry, which are 
summarized as follows (JSA, 1979, p.147-8; JSA monthly report, Apr. 1972, p.51-70, Feb. 
1973, p.60-2). 
 
(1) The coverage of spinning machines purchased 
TIRA purchases the following types of spinning machines, based on applications from 
companies. This range includes all types of spinning machines that members of five trade 
associations (including JSA) deem as operable and list on the ledger of fixed assets as of 
the fiscal-year end latest to the end of 1971, with some exceptions (machines owned by 
large firms and illegal machines are excluded.). 
(2) The purchasing price 
For the standard type of spinning machine, the purchasing price per spindle is 8,800 yen 
plus the resale value as scraps for the incumbent firms, and 10,000 yen plus the resale 
value as scraps.for the exiting firms. The purchasing price is adjusted based upon machine 
type and size, ranging from 75% to 130% of the above standard price. 
(3) The goal and expenses 
The planned goal of purchasing is about 500,000 spindles and the initial fund is 4.58 
billion yen. All expenses for purchasing spinning machines are paid from the initial and 
additional government budgets. 
(4) Penalties on violators 
To put the brake on increases in capacity, applicants are required for 10 years that exiting 
firms cannot be engaged in spinning business and that incumbent firms cannot increase 
capacities. Applicants are also required to set aside 20% of the purchasing price as a 
deposit, which is to be forfeited them if the above requirements are violated. Moreover, 
trade associations are required to pass resolutions not to increase capacities, industry-wide, 
for 10 years. 
 
The actual achievements were 1,113,585 spindles (289 firms) in total, of which 396,112 
(96 firms) were by exits and 717,473 (193 firms) were by incumbents. The achievements 
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by JSA firms were 525,389 spindles in total, where 135,241 were by 13 exits and 390,148 
by 46 incumbents. The coverage by material use was broader than the specified spinning 
machine designated under the 1967 law and it included machine used for wool, hemp or 
other textiles, while non-operable machine were excluded from the target. 
The features in the above scheme can be summarized in the following five points. First, 
the policy gave firms monetary incentive to scrap spinning machines. At least 
theoretically, a more profitable firm scraps less under this scheme (Appendix 2). The 
policy also offered more incentive to small and medium firms and exiting firms, which 
could have the similar effect. 
Second, the coordination for enforceability occurred throughout the process. The 
favorable treatment of priority order for small and medium firms and exiting firms in 
disposal was the result of negotiation between MITI and the industry (JSA, 1979, p.144-
8). The coordination also occurred over penalties on violators10. Third, the voluntary 
disposal gave firms a similar opportunity as the 1968-69 scrapping to consider their long-
term return on investment at the same timing. 
Fourth, however, there are negative factors against that the scrapping was welfare-
enhancing. Since the direct purpose was compensation for the industry’ loss, the process 
of making the planned goal for disposal did not start at the predicted balance between 
demand and supply, but at their requests. In addition, all disposals were implemented at 
government expenses with the higher purchasing price, which is hard to be justified 
solely by the presence of sunk cost. The scale of incentive seems to be larger than the 
1968-69 case, the details of which will be examined in section 3. Lastly, the Structural 
Improvement Program was also strengthened, which could have the opposite effects 
against the disposal, as stated before. 
 
Scrapping policy in 1978 -79 
  In this period, disposal of production facility was proceeded separately between major 
firms and small and medium firms. While major firms tried to take advantage of the 
scheme under the Tokutei fukyo sangyo anteika rinji sochi ho (Law on Temporary 
Measures for the Stabilization of Specified Depressed Industries; hereafter, the 1978 
                                                  
10 The problem was on the requirement for trade associations to pass resolutions in rule 
(4). In contrast to other trade associations, JSA expressed opposition to the requirement 
and started renegotiation with MITI on the grounds that the resolution by trade association 
lacked coherence with policy principles after the abolition of the registration system in 1970. 
Instead of making resolutions. JSA ended up recording in the minutes that each applicant 
promised to fulfill the requirement, and that each non-applicant voluntarily gave 
consideration not to increase capacities in the industry unless the situation changed 
drastically (JSA, 1979, p.149-50). 
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law) enacted in 1978, small and medium firms used the Kyodo haiki jigyo (Joint-
scrapping program) funded by the Small Business Promotion Corporation (in short, 
SMPC). 
  The purpose of the above 1978 law was disposal of production facilities in the Kozo 
fukyo gyoshu (Structurally Depressed Industries) and The Men to boseki gyo (Cotton 
Spinning Industry; including staple rayon, hemp and synthetic fiber spinning) and The 
Somo to boseki gyo (Worsted Spinning Industry) were designated respectively. The law 
prescribed the preparation of the Stabilization Basic Plan including the goal and timing 
of disposal of production facility, establishment of the Tokutei Fukyo Sangyo Shinyo KIkin 
(Credit Foundation for Structurally Depressed Industries; CFSDI), and the procedure to 
direct concerted actions to facilitate disposal. CFSDI provided credit guarantee for 
financing the expenses to release security interest due to disposal and to pay the 
retirement fee. While the concerted actions was exemption of the Antimonopoly Act, the 
regulations for prohibiting deviators were not introduced. 
The scheme of the cotton spinning industry was (1) The planned goal of disposal was 
about 6% of total production capacity in the Basic Plan, and (2) The concerted actions 
were not directed by the Minister of International Trade and Industry. Consequently, firms 
in the cotton spinning industry voluntarily disposed of spinning machines by each firm’s 
own decision, and the actual achievements were about 484 thousands spindles (78% of 
the planned goal) in 1979. 
  Meanwhile, in cotton, rayon and synthetic fiber spinning industry, small and medium 
firms in JSA and other two trade associations launched together the new association to 
apply to the joint-scrapping program. This program was exemption of the Antimonopoly 
Act. More than 90% of expenses for disposal were financed by SMPC and all participants 
in the association were obligated to repay. Consequently, 1.04 million spindles of 
spinning machine were disposed by 107 firms in 1978-79 (Nihon Sen’i Shinbun, 1983; 
Korenaga, 2002). 
  Although detailed data on the purchasing price in the joint-scrapping problem are not 
available, at least the following three points can be listed as features in the above couple 
of schemes. First, compared to the past scrapping policies, as a whole, highly 
anticompetitive measures were not taken. Although the joint-scrapping program was a 
kind of concerted actions, major firms did not join an explicit collective action. Moreover, 
competition policy was strengthened and strictly enforced during the periods by the 
revision of the Antimonopoly Act in 1977 and tightening of approvals on recession cartel11. 
                                                  
11 After the recession cartel in Apr.1977 - Jun. 1977, the cotton spinning industry 
including JSA tried voluntary reduction in production (Jishu gensan) thereafter until the 
13 
 
  Second, as for effectiveness of disposal, previous studies suggest that the joint-
scrapping problem could work better than the 1978 law. Peck, Levin and Goto (1987) 
examined the degree of policy achievement in the target industries in the 1978 law and 
pointed out the possibility that inefficiency due to disposal of production facility was small 
in two spinning industries where many small firms exited, and that those exits might be 
caused by the joint-scrapping program12. 
  Finally, in contrast with past scrapping policies, other policies could facilitate an 
economic resource shift. While the [New] Structural Improvement Program under the 
revised 1967 law was less effective since its utilization rate in 1975-81 was quite low 
(Yamazawa, 1988), temporary laws relating the 1978 law offered public policy measures 
for employment adjustment and depressed regions13 
 
 
3. Measuring productivity and profitability 
3.1 Estimation of production function 
  In this section, I estimate production function using firm-panel data and calculate each 
firm’s productivity and profitability (marginal product) of capital, which will be used later 
as a key variable of investment function analyzed in the next section. 
 
Model and estimation procedure 
  Assume that a firm i’s production technology at time t can be represented as the 
following Cobb-Douglas production function. 
 
    ௜ܻ௧ ൌ ܮ௜௧ఉಽܧ௜௧ఉಶܯ௜௧ఉಾܭ௜௧ఉ಼ ∙ exp	ሺβ଴ ൅ ω௜௧ ൅ η௜௧ሻ  for t = 1,...,T  (1), 
 
where ௜ܻ௧  is output, ܮ௜௧ , ܧ௜௧ , ܯ௜௧  and ܭ௜௧  are inputs of labor, energy, material and 
capital stock. exp	ሺβ଴ ൅ ω௜௧ ൅ η௜௧ሻ represents the Hicks-neutral technical change. (ߚ௅ , 
ߚா, ߚெ, ߚ௄, ߚ଴) are structural parameters. ω௜௧ is productivity shock realized during time 
t and observable for firm i during time t, but unobservable for econometricians. On the 
other hand, η௜௧  is idiosyncratic shock unobservable for both firm i during time t and 
                                                  
next cartel in May 1981- Jun. 1981. 
12 Korenaga (2002) examined the coordination process for designation of two spinning 
industries using the trade associations’ documents, and pointed out that, in case of cotton 
spinning, their primary purpose was not implementing disposal under concerted actions, 
but using the Basic Plan as a means for discussing measures for import restraints. 
13 See Sekiguchi and Horiuchi (1988). they pointed out that the scale of assistance from 




econometricians. Calculating the natural logarithm of both sides in Eq. (1), we can get 
 
    ݕ௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௅݈௧ ൅ ߚா݁௧ ൅ ߚெ݉௧ ൅ ߚ௄݇௧ ൅ ω௧ ൅ η௧    (2), 
 
where (ݕ௧, ݈௧, ݁௧, ݉௧, ݇௧) are the natural logarithm of ( ௜ܻ௧, ܮ௜௧, ܧ௜௧, ܯ௜௧, ܭ௜௧) and the 
subscript i is suppressed for simplicity. 
  The existence of the term ω௧ makes it difficult to estimate consistently the structural 
parameter in Eq. (2). Since a firm can observe ω௧ during time t, if it adjusts the level of 
some inputs in response to the realized value of ω௧, then the problem of endogeneity 
occurs. In general, endogeneity can lead to inconsistency of the standard OLS estimate 
of parameters. Moreover, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003. hereafter LP (2003)) pointed out 
that, under such positive correlation between inputs and ω௧, panel OLS estimation of 
production function tend to underestimate the coefficient of capital stock. Olley and 
Pakes (1996, hereafter OP (1996)) and LP (2003) developed the 2-step estimation 
procedure to solve this problem by specifying the stochastic process of ω௧  and 
assuming the investment function or demand function to intermediate goods to absorbing 
the shock from ω௧. Since OP (1996) procedure requires that the actual investment is 
always positive, which hardly hold in my data, I employed the LP (2003) procedure. 
Assume that ω௧ follows the first order Markov process: 
 
  Pሺω௧|ܫ௧ିଵሻ ൌ Pሺω௧|ω௧ିଵሻ  for t = 1,...,T    (3), 
 
where ܫ௧ିଵ is the information set a firm hold at time t and includes a sequence of the 
past ω௧ ’s realized values ሺωଵ, … ,ω௧ିଵሻ. Pሺω௧|ܫ௧ିଵሻ is the density of ω௧ conditional on 
ܫ௧ିଵ. Eq. (3) represents the statistical properties and it means that the expectation of the 
future ω௧ that a firm makes at time t-1 solely depends on ω௧ିଵ, the observable value 
already realized at that time. Second, assume that labor (݈௧), energy (݁௧) and material 
(݉௧) are variable inputs but that capital (݇௧) is a state variable. Specifically, a firm chooses 
(݈௧, ݁௧, ݉௧) simultaneously right after it observes the realized value of ω௧ at time t, while 
݇௧ is predetermined at time t-1 when ω௧ has not been realized yet. Third, assume that 
factor demand for materials is the following function: 
 
    ݉௧ ൌ ݂ሺ߱௧, ݇௧ሻ       (4), 
 
which means that material inputs is determined based on a couple of state variables 
ሺ߱௧, ݇௧ሻ observable for a firm at time t. If this function is monotonically increasing in ω௧, 
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the inverse function can be derived: 
 
    ߱௧ ൌ ݂ିଵሺ݉௧, ݇௧ሻ       (5), 
 
This equation enables us to represent ߱௧ as the nonlinear function of ሺ݉௧, ݇௧ሻ 
observable for econometricians. In other words, the latter two variables can be used as 
proxies for ߱௧. Substituting Eq. (5) into Eq. (2), we can derive the estimated equation. 
 
    ݕ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௅݈௧ ൅ ߚா݁௧ ൅ ߚெ݉௧ ൅ ߚ௄݇௧ ൅ ݂ିଵሺ݉௧, ݇௧ሻ ൅ η௧ 
   ൌ ߚா݈௧ ൅ ߚா݁௧ ൅ ߶ሺ݉௧, ݇௧ሻ ൅ η௧     (2a), 
 
where ߶ሺ݉௧, ݇௧ሻ ≡ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚெ݉௧ ൅ ߚ௄݇௧ ൅ ݂ିଵሺ݉௧, ݇௧ሻ. LP (2003) proposes to approximate 
߶ሺ݉௧, ݇௧ሻ with either a nonparametric or semiparametric function. I employ the third-
order polynomial of ሺ݉௧, ݇௧ሻ, ߶ሺ݉௧, ݇௧; 	ߣሻ, with parameters ߣ. 
  Moment conditions for identification can be derived in the following way. Since the last 
term in the RHS of Eq. (2a), η௧, is unobservable for a firm at time t, a firm’s decisions on 
(݈௧ , ݁௧ , ݉௧ ) does not depend upon η௧ . ݇௧  is predetermined at time t-1 before η௧  is 
realized, so ݇௧ does not also depend upon η௧. Moreover, the any-order lag of (݈௧, ݁௧, 
݉௧, ݇௧) chosen before time t-1 does not depend upon the unrealized η௧. The sufficient 
conditions for these properties are the following assumption on sequential exogeneity. 
 
  Eሺη௧|݈௧, ݁௧,݉௧, ݇௧, ݈௧ିଵ, ݁௧ିଵ,݉௧ିଵ, ݇௧ିଵ, … , ݈ଵ, ݁ଵ, ݉ଵ, ݇ଵ	ሻ ൌ 0  for t = 1,...,T (6). 
 
  Under these conditions, η௧  is orthogonal to all covariates in Eq. (2a), which 
guarantees consistent estimation of (ߚ௅, ߚா, ߣ) by OLS. This is the 1st stage of the 
estimation routine from LP (2003). For identification, at least the zero conditional mean 
assumptions on (݈௧, ݁௧), which can be derived from Eq. (6), are needed. 
  The rest of the structural parameters, (ߚெ, ߚ௄), are estimated in the 2nd stage. From 
Eq. (3), the conditional mean of ω௧  is Eሺω௧|ܫ௧ିଵሻ ൌ Eሺω௧|ω௧ିଵሻ . Defining ξ௧ ≡ ω௧ െ
Eሺω௧|߱௧ିଵሻ, we can show Eሺξ௧|ܫ௧ିଵሻ ൌ 0. Since ܫ௧ିଵ contains the any order lag of factor 
inputs chosen at or before time t-1, we can get the following condition: 
 
    Eሺξ௧|	݇௧, ݈௧ିଵ, ݁௧ିଵ,݉௧ିଵ, ݇௧ିଵ, ݈௧ିଶ, …ሻ ൌ 0  for t = 1,...,T   (7). 
 
In the 2nd stage, LP (2003) proposes the following estimation routines to get a consistent 
estimator of (ߚெ, ߚ௄ ). First, given any candidate values ߚ∗ ൌ ሺߚெ∗ , ߚ௄∗ ሻ, calculate the 
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estimate of ω௧ as ෝ߱௧ ൌ ߶෠௧ െ ߚெ∗ ݉௧ െ ߚ௄∗݇௧, where ߶෠௧ ൌ ߶൫݉௧, ݇௧; 	ߣመ൯ and ߣመ is the OLS 
estimate of λ from the 1st-stage. Secondly specify Eሺω௧|߱௧ିଵሻ as parametric function 
of ω௧ିଵ and regress ෝ߱௧  on the lag of itself to get the estimate of Eሺω௧|߱௧ିଵሻ. Next 
calculate the estimate of η௧ ൅ ξ௧  as ߟ௧ ൅ ߦ௧෣ ൌ ෝ߱௧ െ ݕ௧ െ ߚመ௅݈௧ െ ߚመா݁௧ െ ߚெ∗ ݉௧ െ ߚ௄∗݇௧ െ
Eሺω௧|߱௧ିଵሻ෣ . Under conditions (6) and (7), the following moment conditions hold: 
 
    Eሾሺη௧ ൅ ξ௧ሻܼ௧ሿ ൌ 0  for t = 1,...,T     (8), 
 
where ܼ௧ ൌ ሺ݇௧, ݈௧ିଵ, ݁௧ିଵ,݉௧ିଵ, ݇௧ିଵ, ݈௧ିଶ, … ሻ . Finally we obtain estimates (ߚመெ, ߚመ௄ ) by 
minimizing the GMM criterion function with respect to ߚ∗ ൌ ሺߚெ∗ , ߚ௄∗ ሻ: 
 
minఉ∗ ∑ ൛∑ ሺߟ௧ ൅ ߦ௧෣ ሺߚ∗ሻሻܼ௛௧௧ ൟ
ଶ
௛       (9), 
 
where h is indexing the elements of ܼ௧. For identification, it is enough to use at least two 
orthogonal conditions of (݇௧, ݉௧ିଵ) among ܼ௧ from Eq. (8)14. 
 
Data and definition of variables 
  Our main resource of data is (Menshi) boseki jijo sankosho (Statistics on the Japanese 
cotton-spinning industry, Japan Spinners’ Association (JSA), 1965-79), unless other 
sources are referred. This data contains 134 firms at the beginning of 1965 and 85 firms 
1979 and it covers at least 64.7% and 61.9% of workers in the cotton and chemical fiber 
spinning industry at 1965 and 197915. JSA data contains detailed input-output infomation 
for several segments (spinning, weaving, and so on), from which I use only data on the 
spinning segment. 
  The panel dataset is arranged based on data availability and events. For new entrants 
after 1965, observations a year after their entries are used. For firms vanishing due to 
exit or those dropping from this survey due to withdrawal from JSA, observations a year 
before these events are used. For firms merging into a single firm or a firm separated 
into multiple firms, I treat them as hypothetical firms by consolidating data before mergers 
                                                  
14 I used the Stata program offered by Petrin, Poi and Levinsohn (2004) for the estimation 
routine of Levinsohn and Petrin, where optimization is based on Newton’s method. The 
bootstrap is also used for inference, sampling with replacement from firm-level observation. 
15 The number of workers in JSA data is 107,727 in 1965 and 52,006 in 1979, but the 
figures are underestimated because it excludes non-production workers at the 
headquarters office. On the other hand, total number of regular workers in cotton spinning 




or after separations. For firms temporarily stopping operation due to a fire, not reported 
and so on, observations from stopping year to restarting year are excluded. For firms 
missing data, the corresponding year is excluded. Consequently, the number of firms is 
at most 124 and the number of observations is 1441 in 1965-79. 
  As for definitions of variables, I followed Kiyota and Okazaki (2010), but made some 
modifications due to data availability. Output is defined as the weighted average of 9 
output commodities16, where the weight is the sales share of each commodity. Sales data 
is not available in JSA data, so I used unit price data from Wholesale Price Statistics 
(Bank of Japan) to calculate sales. 
All inputs are those used in the spinning stage of production. For labor, I used the sum 
of the number of production workers and white-collar workers, and multiplied it by the 
total hours of operation in a year to convert to flows17. Capital stock is the operating 
number of spindles of spinning machines. Material input is defined as the weighted 
average of 7 materials, where the weight is each share of material costs18. Energy input 
is electricity usage19. The above outputs and inputs are transformed to logarithmic value. 




The results are in Table 2. As for 1965-79, the OLS results (PF-11) shows that the 
estimate of coefficient of ݇, ߚመ௄, is negative and statistically significant, which contradicts 
the usual assumption on monotonicity. The null that there exists constant returns to scale 
                                                  
16 9 commodities are pure cotton spun yarn, mixed cotton spun yarn, pure rayon spun 
yarn, mixed rayon spun yarn, other natural fiber spun yarn, pure synthetic spun yarn, mixed 
synthetic spun yarn, cotton waste, other waste. Subcategories of synthetic spun yarn are 
vinylon, polyester, acrylic and others. See details in the Appendix 1. 
17 The original data of capital and labor are biannual, where each half period value is a 6-
month average of the number of operable spindle of spinning machines and workers, so I 
calculated a 12-month average to average the former-half and the latter-half values. 6-
month averages of the number of workers are not available in 1973-5, so I use the average 
of the end-of-year values at current and previous years instead. 
Similarly, total hours of operation at each half period is a firm’s 6-month average of 
operated days multiplied by its 6-month average of operated hours per day, but with a few 
data missing. I substituted the other half value or the industry’s average of the year for 
missing values and calculated the average of both half values multiplied by 12. 
18 7 Commodities are cotton, rayon staple, other natural fibers (including cotton waste), 
vinylon, polyester, acrylic, and other synthetic fibers. 
19 The data on coal and heavy oil usage are available only in 1965-69. I calculated each 
share at the industry level by the calorie conversion factor from General Energy Statistics 
(1965, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy). The resulting shares are electricity 
94.8%, coal 0.3%, and heavy oil 4.9% in 1969 and stable over 1965-69. Therefore, I 
believe that electricity can be used as a plausible proxy for energy usage. 
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is rejected. On the other hand, the LP result using (݈௧, ݁௧, ݇௧,݉௧ିଵ) as IVs is (PF-12), where 
ߚመ௄ turns to be positive, as suggested by LP (2003). Here, the existence of constant 
returns to scale is not rejected. 
Since structural break could occur around 1973-74, I also estimated in the sub-periods. 
The results in the 1965-73 estimation are shown in the third and fourth column. Again, 
LP procedure gives larger ߚመ௄ than OLS and constant returns to scale is not rejected. 
On the other hand, in the case of the latter half of the 1970’s, since estimation under just 
identification restriction suffered difficulties in convergence, I added more IVs and 
estimated under over-identification restriction, shortening the estimation period. The 
results in 1976-79 are shown in the fifth and sixth column. Contrary to 1966-73, the 
coefficient of labor also turns out to be insignificant along with that of capital, which 
suggests that these inputs were used more excessively than the previous periods. LP 
procedure again raises the coefficients of capital and constant returns to scale is not 
rejected. 
 
The industry’s productivity growth 
  Estimation of production function enables us to make several measures on firm 
performances. Since we added year dummies for overall technical change, a firm i’s 
productivity level in year t, ݌ݎ݀ܿݐ௜௧, is defined as 
 
    ݌ݎ݀ܿݐ௜௧ ൌ 	exp	ሺ߱௜௧ ൅ ∑ ߚ௦ ∙ ݀ݑ݉ሾݏሿ௜௧ሻ௧௦ୀ଺଺     (10) 
 
where ݀ݑ݉ሾݏሿ௜௧ is the year s’s dummy, which is equal to 1 if t = s or 0 otherwise, and ߚ௦ 
is its coefficient. Then the aggregated productivity level in year t, ݌ݎ݀ܿݐ௧, is defined as 
the weighted average of Eq. (10). 
 
    ݌ݎ݀ܿݐ௧ ൌ 	∑ ሼݏሺܻሻ௜௧ ∙ ݌ݎ݀ܿݐ௜௧ሽ௜       (11) 
 
where ݏሺܻሻ௜௧ is the share of a firm i’s output in year t. The estimates of ݌ݎ݀ܿݐ௧  are 
obtained by inserting the estimates ( ෝ߱௜௧, ߚመ௧) into Eq. (10) and evaluating Eq. (11) with the 
actual data of ௜ܻ௧. The results are shown in Figure 1. 
According to the 1965-79 estimate, the industry’s productivity level shows an upward 
trend from 1967, but falls after 1973 in two consecutive years, and then increases again 
with weak fluctuations after 1976. The estimates in sub-periods (1965-73, 76-79) also 
support this evidence, although the 1976-79 estimate levels are quite low due to the 
different starting year. To check the contribution of omega and the overall technical 
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change, the productivity level due to only ߱௜௧ are also calculated and shown in the figure. 
We can see that while the evolution of ෝ߱௜௧ mostly explains the baseline of productivity 
level during the whole periods, the contribution of the overall technical change slightly 
appears in 1967-73, but disappears in 1974 and thereafter. This means that the 
unobserved source heterogeneous among firms is quite important. 
 
3.2 Capital profitability and the scale of incentives for scrapping 
Estimation of production function also gives as marginal product of capital containing 
the unobserved productivity, a stream of which is one of the key components in the long-
term return on investment, along with the resale value in the future. Here, I compare the 
available purchasing prices for scrapping with them to roughly grasp the scale of 
incentives generated by policies. 
Marginal product of capital is derived from Eq. (1), noting that β଴ is incorporated into 
the level of ω௜௧ and not directly estimated. 
 
    ݌݉݌݇௜௧ ൌ ௒ܲ,௜௧ ⋅ ߲ ௜ܻ௧ ߲ܭ௜௧⁄ ൌ ௒ܲ,௜௧ ⋅ ߚ௄ܮ௜௧ఉಽܧ௜௧ఉಶܯ௜௧ఉಾܭ௜௧ఉ಼ିଵ ⋅ ݌ݎ݀ܿݐ௜௧ (12) 
 
Since the sale share are different among firms, I put the subscript i to the price variable 
to show the price difference each firm faces. Then, the aggregated marginal product of 
capital in year t is defined as the weighted average of Eq. (12). 
 
    ݌݉݌݇௧ ൌ 	∑ ሼݏሺܭሻ௜௧ ∙ ݌݉݌݇௜௧ሽ௜       (13) 
 
where ݏሺܭሻ௜௧ is the share of a firm i’s capital in year t. The estimates of ݌݉݌݇௧ are 
obtained by inserting the estimates of ݌ݎ݀ܿݐ௜௧ and structural parameters into Eq. (12). 
and evaluating at firms’ data on outputs, inputs and price. ௒ܲ,௜௧ is the weighted average 
of 9 output commodities’ prices, and the weight is the sale share of each commodity, 
which were already defined before. 
Figure 2 shows the resulting nominal and real estimates of ݌݉݌݇௧, where the latter is 
deflated by GDP deflator (1965 base year)20, along with the unit price of the spinning 
machine in 1965-72 available from BOJ statistics. The estimated nominal marginal 
product of capital shows quite similar movements to productivity. It starts to increase in 
1967, keeps an upward trend until 1973, falls in 1974-75, but increases again from 1976 
                                                  
20 There is a possibility that ݌݉݌݇௧ is overestimated because it can also reflect the 




and continues at a higher level than periods before 1973. On the other hand, the 
estimates of real marginal product of capital shows relatively modest upward trends 
before 1973 than nominal ones, and after 1974, falls at the lower level than before 1973. 
Such evidence is taken to mean that the investment environment firms faced got 
drastically worse around 1974. 
Compare the nominal ݌݉݌݇௧  with the purchasing price in 1968-69 and 1972-73 
scrapping, ignoring the resale value in the future and time discount factor. Then, we can 
see that the scale of incentives generated by voluntary disposal is large enough for a 
firm in average to consider the long-term decision on investment in both periods. As for 
the 1968-69 case, the “gross” purchasing price (excluding the resale value) of an 
operable machine in compulsory disposal (3,000 yen) was about one third of the price of 
a new machine in 1968 (10,163 yen), and higher than the 1969 value of ݌݉݌݇௧ (1981.5 
yen), but lower than the sum of 1969-70 values (1,981.5 + 2,343.5 = 4,325.0 yen). This 
means that for a firm planning to use the last unit of machine for more than 2 years, 
compulsory disposal of it could result in loss. Similarly, the “gross” purchasing price for 
voluntary disposal offered by JSA (5,000 yen) was about half the price of a new machine, 
and lay between the sum of 1969-70 values and that of 1969-71 values (1,981.5 + 
2,343.5 + 2,465.7 = 6,790.7 yen). This means that for at least an incumbent firm planning 
to disinvest within 2 years, voluntary disposal would be attractive21. 
As for 1972-73 case, the purchasing price for (voluntary) disposal for incumbents 
(8,800 yen) was about 80% of the price of a new machine, and lay between the sum of 
1974-75 values (3,728.2 + 2,759.3 = 6,487.5 yen) and that of 1974-76 values (3,728.2 + 
2,759.3 + 3,628.2 = 10,115.7 yen) of ݌݉݌݇௧. Similar results were obtained in the price 
for disposal by exits. This means that at least for a firm planning to disinvest or exit within 
2 years, scrapping would be attractive22. 
  Figure 2 also depicts the evolution of the industry level of physical capital (spinning 
                                                  
21 I also compared the purchasing price with the residual values of existing machines in the 
accounting base, by amortizing the unit price of new machines in each year with the 
depreciation rate in tax law in those days. The ordinary depreciation rate is 15.2% (14 
years) in 1965-69, 18.9% (11 years) in 1970 and 20.6% (10 years) in 1971-79, calculated 
from the useful life of spinning machines in the parentheses by the declining balance 
method (the final residual value is 10%). 
 The calculated residual values in 1968-69 are 4,674 and 3,964 yen if it was purchased in 
1966, so voluntarily disposing machines purchased two years before could avoid the asset 
loss, although compulsory disposal could hurt the balance sheets. Similarly, the calculated 
residual value in 1972-73 are 8,512 and 6,762 yen if purchased in 1971, so even disposing 
machines purchased just a year before could avoid the asset loss. 
22 The scale of incentive in 1972-73 scrapping could be larger because the estimates of 




machine) measured in several states, which are available from JSA data23. The policy 
impacts to these production facilities will be examined in the following sections. 
 
 
4. Econometric analysis on effects of scrapping policies 
4.1 Direct effects on investment under policy implementation 
  The incentives offered by scrapping policy apparently affected a firm’s investment 
behavior but, as already clarified in section 3, the policy schemes are quite different 
between the periods, and common policy variables are not available in the whole period. 
One of the standard approaches to model such policy effects is to identify the “structural 
change” in a firm’s investment decision. More specifically, I split the whole period into 
several sub-periods and estimate investment function in the form of saturated model with 
the policy-implementation-year dummy. 
 
Model and estimation procedure 
Assume the following investment function. 
 
    lnሺܭ௧ାଵሻ ൌ ߙ଴ ∙ lnሺܭ௧ሻ ൅ ߚ ∙ lnሺ݌݉݌݇௧ሻ ൅ ݔ௧ߛ ൅ ݑ௧  for t = 1,...,T  (14). 
 
The subscript i is suppressed for simplicity. ln	ሺܭ௧ሻ  and ln	ሺ݌݉݌݇௧ሻ  are the natural 
logarithms of capital stock and real marginal product of capital at time t, both of which 
were defined in the previous section. The model reflects the timing of a firm’s decision 
that it observes during period t the realized value of ݌݉݌݇௧  given ܭ௧  chosen in the 
previous period, and chooses ܭ௧ାଵ  at the end of period t. This is consistent with 
assumptions on variable inputs and capital stock for production function estimation. ݔ௧ 
is a vector of other controlling variables including unity and chosen before or, at the latest, 
at the beginning of time t. ݑ௧ is the idiosyncratic error defined later. The lag of dependent 
variable, lnሺܭ௧ሻ, appears in the RHS of Eq. (14), which represent the partial adjustment 
of investment behavior. Subtracting lnሺܭ௧ሻ  from the both sides of Eq. (14) and 
                                                  
23 The number in registered units is on machines registered under the New Textile Law 
until 1970, which includes not only operable machines (machines ready for operation), but 
also machines legally banned for use under either the above law or the recession cartel 
approved by the Japan Fair Trade Commission. The number in operable and non-operable 
units are on machines surveyed for Seisan dotai tokei chosa (Current Survey of Production, 
MITI). The latter unit consists of machines legally banned for use, or stopped for 
reparations, modification or transfer. We can also use installed units after 1970. According 
to descriptions in JSA data, the coverage of the above all types of units are almost similar 
in that the main material inputs are raw cotton, rayon staple and synthetic staple. 
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approximating the LHS with lnሺܭ௧ାଵሻ െ lnሺܭ௧ሻ ≒ ሺܭ௧ାଵ െ ܭ௧ሻ ܭ௧⁄ ≡ ܫ௧ାଵ ܭ௧⁄ , we can get 
 
    ܫ௧ାଵ ോ ܭ௧ ൌ ߙ ∙ lnሺܭ௧ሻ ൅ ߚ ∙ lnሺ݌݉݌݇௧ሻ ൅ ݔ௧ߛ ൅ ݑ௧    (15), 
 
where ܫ௧ାଵ ോ ܭ௧ is called the investment capital ratio, and α ൌ ߙ଴ െ 1. When a firm exits 
from market, ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ 0 , so ܫ௧ାଵ ܭ௧⁄ ൌ െܭ௧ ܭ௧⁄ ൌ െ1. This means that the dependent 
variable is censored at -1 if a firm exits, so I employed the following Pooled Tobit model 
as an estimated equation. 
 
    ܫ௜௧ାଵ ോ ܭ௜௧ ൌ max	ሾ	െ1, α ∙ lnሺܭ௜௧ሻ ൅ ߚ ∙ lnሺ݌݉݌݇௜௧ሻ ൅ ݔ௜௧ߛ ൅ ݑ௜௧ሿ  (16), 
  ݑ௜௧|	lnሺܭ௜௧ሻ , lnሺ݌݉݌݇௜௧ሻ , ݔ௜௧		~		Normalሺ0, ߪ௨ଶሻ    (17), 
 
where the lag of dependent variable could be allowed in RHS. As for the unobserved 
cross-sectional heterogeneity, the unobserved heterogeneity in productivity level, ߱௜௧, is 
available from estimated production function and included in ݌݉݌݇௧ିଵ, and the lag of 
dependent variable is added to Eq. (14). Therefore, I believe that the unobserved cross-
sectional heterogeneity in investment behavior would be well captured by these variables. 
Under these assumptions, the parameters in Eq. (16) are consistently estimated by the 
partial likelihood method. The parameter restrictions on Eq. (16) with or without the policy 
are derived from the model in Appendix 2. 
 
Data and definition of variables 
  The source of data is almost same as in the previous section. ܭ௜௧ is the number of 
spinning machines at the end-of-year t-1, and ܫ௜௧ାଵ is defined as the change in ܭ௜௧ from 
the end-of-year t-1 till the end-of-year t. The expected coefficient sign of lnሺܭ௜௧ሻ is 
ambiguous because it depends upon both the speed of partial adjustment (α ൌ ߙ଴ െ 1 
can be negative) of capital stock and scale economies due to other reasons than through 
production (Recall that constant returns to scale is not rejected in the previous section). 
To examine the difference in policy effects, I used several states of capital stock 
(operable, registered or installed), already explained at the end of section 3.2. ݌݉݌݇௧ 
has already been defined and calculated in the previous section and deflated by a GDP 
deflator. I used several estimates obtained in section 3 to check the robustness. The 
expected sign of its coefficient is positive. 
ݔ௜௧ contains the following variables. The first group captures effects of the downstream 
production stages in a firm. ݓ݁ܽݐݓ݅௜௧ is a dummy of a firm i’s holding production facilities 
for weaving or twisting at the beginning of year t. Similarly, ݐݔ݌ݎ௜௧  and ݌ݎܿݏ௜௧  are 
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dummies of firm i’s holding production facilities for secondary textile products or 
processing at the beginning of year t, respectively. All data are available from JSA data. 
The expected sign of these coefficients are ambiguous due to competing powers: While 
these activities can be the source of technological spillover, diversification of 
commodities, or scale economies due to shared use of managerial resources and 
common facilities and offices (which have positive effects), they can also change the 
opportunity cost of resources in the spinning stage and cause resources to shift toward 
the downstream stages (which have negative effects). 
  The second group in ݔ௜௧  are on a firm’s experiences in past events. ݉ݎ݃௜௧  is a 
dummy for a firm i’s having been experienced mergers prior to year t. Similarly, ݀ܿ݉௜௧ is 
a dummy for a firm i’s having been experienced separations prior to year t. Both events 
are available in JSA data. Since these events rearrange firm organization and 
management practices, it is not easy to predict the expected sign of both coefficients. 
 The third group in ݔ௜௧ measure the differences in firm characteristics in wider scope, 
but are used only in the sub-period estimation (1966-73 and 1974-79) due to data 
limitation. ݀ݒݎݐݕ௜௧ is a dummy of a firm i’s operating non-textile business activities inside 
the firm at the beginning of the estimated periods. ݂݂݈ܽݐ݁௜௧ is a dummy of a firm i’s 
having affiliate firms at the beginning of the estimated periods. Both data are compiled 
from Zenkoku sen’i kigyo yoran (the Yearbook of Textile/Apparel Companies; the Credit 
Exchange Agency). Due to data limitation, both are measured as of the fiscal year-end 
of 1966 in the 1966-73 estimation, or the fiscal year-end of 1973 in the 1974-79 
estimation, respectively24. ݂݀݅௜௧  is a dummy of a firm i’s holding overseas affiliated 
companies during the estimated periods. Data are compiled from Kaigai shinshutsu kigyo 
soran (Overseas Japanese companies database; Toyo Keizai Inc.) and measured in 
1966-74 or 1974-79, respectively. The expected sign of these three coefficients are also 
ambiguous, affected by competing powers. The reasons are similar to the downstream 
stage activities mentioned before: These variables capture not only the differences in the 
opportunity cost of resources in the spinning stage measured over the border of the 
segment, the firm or the nation, but also effects of technological spillover, a kind of scale 
economies, or the channels to overseas market. Year dummies are also added to the 
estimated equation to control effects of the unobserved time-varying factors including the 
                                                  
24 Information on business relations and human or capital ties were picked up from credit 
records in the Yearbook. Consequently, the following firms are defined as “holding affiliate 
firms”: (1) firms holding subsidiaries, affiliates or a parent firm, (2) firms under capital 
participation or supervision of other firms, (3) firms being engaged in consignment 
production from material suppliers, and (4) firms management representatives of which is 
also a board member of other firms. Identifying the effect of each category was difficult due 




Moreover, in estimation of 1966-69, a couple of minor modifications were made for 
controlling the effect of other policies. First, the adjusted amount of operable machines 
(ܭ௢,௜௧௔ ) was also used as ܭ௜௧ to correct the effect of the short-term suspension under the 
recession cartel: ܭ௢,௜௧௔ ൌ ܭ௢,௜௧ ൅ ݏ௜௧ܭ௢ଵ,௜௧/9 for t = 1965 and 1966 and ܭ௢,௜௧௔ ൌ ܭ௢,௜௧  for 
otherwise. Here, ܭ௢,௜௧ is the (unadjusted) amount of operable machine, ܭ௢ଵ,௜௧ is the first 
segment’ amount of ܭ௢,௜௧, and ݏ௜௧ is the share of cotton-spun yarn and rayon-spun yarn 
for a total output of spun yarn25. Second, to control the effect of S & B constraint on 
investment, I modeled the effect of binding constraints by parameterizing the Lagrange 
multiplier as a function of ܭ௦,௜௧ ܭ௢,௜௧⁄  in Appendix 2. ܭ௦,௜௧ ൌ ܭ௥,௜௧ െ ܭ௢,௜௧ is the amount of 
suspended machines, where ܭ௥,௜௧ is the amount of registered machines. The expected 
sign of its coefficients is positive without scrapping policy, but ambiguous with that policy 
(see Appendix 2). 
  Panel dataset are arranged based on data availability and attritions in the same 
manner as estimation of production function in the previous section. Consequently, the 
number of firms is at most 117, and the number of observations is 1339 (including 27 
exits) in the 1966-79 estimation. Similarly, there were 115 and 815 (including 14 exits) in 
the 1966-73 estimation, 93 and 524 (including 13 exits) in the 1974-79 estimation. In the 
case of using ݀ݒݎݐݕ௜௧ , ݂݂݈ܽݐ݁௜௧  and ݂݀݅௜௧ , the sample decreased to 101 and 744 
(including 9 exits) in the 1966-73 estimation, 84 and 490 (including 12 exits) in the 1974-
79 estimation. The saturated model was estimated in the sub-periods, considering the 
change in the business conditions (around 1973-74), as well as the change of the overall 
policy scheme (around 1970 and 1974-75), explained in section 2. 
 
Estimation Results 
  Table 3 summarizes the results of 1966-79, 1966-73 and 1974-79 estimations without 
the interaction terms 26 . For comparison, I used the number of operable machines 
available during the whole period. Focusing on the results on key variables, at least the 
                                                  
25 The recession cartels were implemented from October 1965 until March 1967, and 
almost all JSA firms joined. The agreement for concerted actions prescribed that each firm 
suspended 10% of the operable spinning machines that belonged in the first segment 
(used for production of cotton-, rayon- or synthetic-spun yarns) and that had been used for 
production of cotton- or rayon-spun yarn since January 1965 (JSA, 1969, p.208-18; JSA 
monthly report, Oct. 1965, p.2-20, Jun. 1966, p.30-40.). Then, the amount of machines still 
operable in the first segment after 10% suspension can be approximated by ݏ௜௧ܭ௢ଵ,௜௧, and 
ݏ௜௧ܭ௢ଵ,௜௧/9 is equal to the amount of the short-term suspended machines under the cartels. 
26 The OLS results were almost the same as the Tobit ones in all cases, so only the Tobit 
results are listed. Similar results were obtained between several estimates of ݌݉݌݇௧, so 
only the results using the 1965-79 estimates are listed. 
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following two findings can be made. First, lnሺ݌݉݌݇௜௧ሻ has positive effect on capital 
investment in 1966-79 and 1966-73, but does not in 1974-79. When using only lnሺܭ௜௧ሻ 
and lnሺ݌݉݌݇௜௧ሻ without year dummies, the estimated coefficients are all statistically 
significant. Those of lnሺ݌݉݌݇௜௧ሻ  are small, but all positive as expected in all the 
estimation periods (Eq. (1-1), (2-1) and (3-1)). However, once adding year dummies and 
past event variables, while similar results are obtained in 1966-79 and 1966-73 (Eq. (1-
2) and (2-2)), the statistical significance in the estimated coefficients of lnሺ݌݉݌݇௜௧ሻ 
vanished in 1974-79 (Eq. (3-1)). This contrast persists even if other factors are controlled 
(Eq. (1-3), (2-3) and (3-3)). These results suggest that while firms with the lower return 
on investment invested less or disinvested as a whole before 1973, these firmｓ ceased 
to do so during the depression period after 1974. Second, the coefficients of ݀ݒݎݐݕ௜௧, 
݂݂݈ܽݐ݁௜௧ and ݂݀݅௜௧ are all insignificant in both sub-periods (Eq. (2-4) and (3-4)). 
Next, splitting 1966-73 at the year 1970 when the registration system for production 
facilities was abolished, I estimated the model with the interaction terms in 1966-69 and 
1971-73. The most amounts of disposal occurred in 1969 under the 1968-69 policy and 
in 1973 under the 1972-73 policy. So defining the policy-implementation year dummy as 
1969 year dummy in the former case and 1973 year dummy in the latter case, I inserted 
the interaction terms of this dummy and all covariates into the model27. 
  The 1966-69 estimation is listed in Table 4. The main results are in Eq. (4-5oa) and (4-
5o), and the results are quite similar with or without adjusting the effect of the recession 
cartel. First, while the estimated coefficient of lnሺ݌݉݌݇௜௧ሻ is positive and significant, that 
of the interaction terms, lnሺ݌݉݌݇௜௧ሻ ∗ ݕ݀ݑ݉69 , is negative at the same order of 
magnitude and significance. In short, the positive relationship between investment and 
its returns vanished under scrapping policy. This suggests that, treating several kinds of 
schemes (compulsory, voluntary, or by exits) together, a firm on average scrapped 
machines regardless of their profitability, which could generate distortion in resource 
allocation. Second, the estimated coefficient of ܭ௦,௜௧ ܭ௢,௜௧⁄  is significantly positive as 
expected, while that of the interaction terms, ܭ௦,௜௧ ܭ௢,௜௧⁄ ∗ ݕ݀ݑ݉69, is insignificant. This 
means that a firm with more suspended machines invested more on operable machines, 
which further implies that scrap & build constraint also distorted a firm’s investment 
decision during the period with or without scrapping policy. Third, to some extent, the 
above results depend upon firm exits from the market. The statistical significance in the 
                                                  
27 ݀ݒݎݐݕ௜௧, ݂݂݈ܽݐ݁௜௧ and ݂݀݅௜௧, are dropped out of the equation since the coefficients were 
insignificant in most cases and marginally significant in a very few cases. The results from 
the late 1970s are suppressed because I estimated the saturated models as well, but most 
of the estimated coefficients are insignificant and any economically interpretable results on 
the key variables could not be obtained stably. 
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coefficients of main variables decrease if we drop censored data due to firm exits (Eq. 
(4-3oa)), which implies that firm exits had a considerable role in cutting down unprofitable 
production facilities. 
The results on registered machines are in the latter part of Table 4. Note that the results 
can be considered a combination of the following different kinds of firm decisions. Under 
the S & B constraint, a unit of increase in operable machines needs two units of decrease 
in suspended ones. So the changes in registered machines (ܭ௥,௜௧ ൌ ܭ௢,௜௧ ൅ ܭ௦,௜௧) contain 
at least a unit of decrease due to this constraint if a firm increases operable ones, which 
reverses the expected sign of regression coefficients (see Appendix 2). At the same time, 
ܭ௥,௜௧ also decreases due to a firm exit, and in this case, we can expect the same sign of 
coefficients as those of operable machine28. 
  First, we can also find the role of firm exits to cut down the unprofitable machines. The 
estimated coefficient of lnሺ݌݉݌݇௜௧ሻ is significantly positive in Eq. (4-3ra), but turn to be 
insignificant in Eq. (4-2ra) if samples censored by firm exits are excluded. Second, in Eq. 
(4-5ra), the coefficient of the interaction terms, lnሺ݌݉݌݇௜௧ሻ ∗ ݕ݀ݑ݉69, is significantly 
negative at the same order of magnitude as that of lnሺ݌݉݌݇௜௧ሻ, which is similar to the 
results in Eq. (4-5oa) and (4-5o). In short, under scrapping policy, the positive relationship 
between investment and its returns vanished again in this case. Third, the estimated 
coefficient of ܭ௦,௜௧ ܭ௢,௜௧⁄  is significantly negative, while that of the interaction terms, 
ܭ௦,௜௧ ܭ௢,௜௧⁄ ∗ ݕ݀ݑ݉69, is still insignificant (Eq. (4-5ra)). This means that a firm with more 
suspended machines decreased more in registered machines during the period with or 
without scrapping policy. We see again that scrap & build constraint distorted a firm’s 
investment decision, but did so in the opposite direction of the operable machine’s case. 
  The 1971-73 estimation is listed in Table 5. First, similar to the 1966-69 estimation, we 
can find again that firm exits worked to enhance the use of profitable machine in both 
cases of operable and installed one. While the coefficients of lnሺ݌݉݌݇௜௧ሻ  has low 
statistical significance if firm exits are excluded (Eq. (5-2o) and (5-2i)), their significance 
increases once these samples are included (Eq. (5-3o) and (5-3i)). Second, as for the 
effect of scrapping policy, the results are different between the different states of 
machines (Eq. (5-4o) and (5-4i)). While the estimated coefficient of lnሺ݌݉݌݇௜௧ሻ  is 
significantly positive in both equations, that of the interaction terms, lnሺ݌݉݌݇௜௧ሻ ∗
ݕ݀ݑ݉73, is not significant in the case of operable ones, but significantly negative at the 
same order of magnitude in the case of installed ones. In short, under scrapping policy, 
                                                  
28 A firm may also decrease the suspended machine simply due to its low return in the 
future when it is allowed to operate, but it is difficult to estimate such kind of returns 




the positive relationship between investment and its return still remained in terms of 
operable machines but vanished in terms of installed ones. The difference between the 
two cases suggests that some firms still held the installed but non-operable machines, 
regardless of their profitability, even after scrapping was implemented, possibly because 
the target of scrapping was the operable machine only, as explained in section 2. 
 
 
4.2 Effects on post-policy investment through revelation of the long-term return 
  Here, I focus on voluntary disposal in 1968-69, which was offered by JSA, and examine 
its indirect effect on post-treatment investment during 1970-72, which is the liberalization 
periods after the abolition of the registration system for production facilities and just 
before the next scrapping policy was implemented.  
A distinctive feature of this policy schemes is that it not only could force a firm to commit 
to irreversible disinvestment, but also could help a firm calculate its long-term return on 
investment given other firms’ decisions. As previously mentioned, the purchasing price, 
even if excluding the resale value as scrap, was more than the sum of the short-term 
capital profitability for the following two years (see subsection 3.2), and imposed the 
penalty which was at least 20% (= 1,000/5,000) or 60% (= 3,000/5,000) of the purchasing 
prices (see section 2). Since the presence or absence in voluntary disposal is the 
indicator of the long-term return on investment, a firm’s participation in voluntary disposal 
can be viewed as its revelation of its long-term return on investment observable for other 
firms. The hypothesis tested here is that firms having participated in voluntary disposal 
in 1968-69 still remained invest less or disinvest during 1970-72, controlling other factors 
including the short-term return on investment. 
 
Model and estimation procedure 
One of the merits in viewing a firm participation as its revelation of the long-term return 
is that this enables us to derive the estimated equation from the long-term investment 
decision, without extrapolating policy variables and its interaction terms. Assume the 
following investment function, 
 
    lnሺܭ௧ାଵሻ െ lnሺܭ௧ሻ ൌ ߜଵܴ௅,௧ାଵ,௘ ൅ ݔ௧ߜଶ ൅ ݁௧    (18). 
 
The subscript i is suppressed for simplicity. The LHS of Eq. (18), lnሺܭ௧ାଵሻ െ lnሺܭ௧ሻ, is 
the growth rate of capital during period t+1. ܴ௅,௧ାଵ,௘  is the expected value of the long-term 
return on investment at time t+1 thereafter that a firm makes during period t, where the 
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subscript ܮ indicates the long-term and ݁ the expected value. ݔ௧ is a vector of other 
controlling variables including unity. ݔ௧  was chosen before or, at the latest, at the 
beginning of period t. The timing of a firm’s decision is the same as the model in the 
previous subsection. ݁௧ is the idiosyncratic error. Deriving Eq. (18) from time t until t + T 
-1, respectively, and summing the each side of them, we have the following. 
 
    lnሺܭ௧ା்ሻ െ lnሺܭ௧ሻ ൌ ߜଵ ∑ ܴ௅,௧ା௦,௘௦்ୀଵ ൅ ሺ∑ ݔ௧ା௦்ିଵ௦ୀ଴ ሻߜଶ ൅ ∑ ݁௧ା௦்ିଵ௦ୀ଴  
                   ൌ ߜଵ ∑ ܴ௅,௧ା௦,௘௦்ୀଵ ൅ ݔ௧ሺܶߜଶሻ ൅ ∑ ݁௧ା௦்ିଵ௦ୀ଴    (19). 
 
To derive the second equality, ݔ௧ is assumed to be constant over the period, which is 
plausible in the dataset. Assume further that ܴ௅,௧ା௦,௘  can be represented as the following 
linear approximation of the expected value: 
 
    ܴ௅,௧ା௦,௘ ൌ E൫ܴ௅,௧ା௦หܴ௧ା௦ିଵ, ܴ௅,௧ା௦ିଵ௘ ൯ ൌ ߠ଴ ൅ ߠଵܴ௧ା௦ିଵ ൅ ߠଶܴ௅,௧ା௦ିଵ௘   (20), 
 
where ܴ௧ା௦ିଵ is the short-term return on investment during period t+s-1. Eq. (20) means 
that a firm observes the short-term return on investment and revises its expectation on 
the long-term return on investment during the current period, given the past expectation. 
Inserting the lag of Eq. (20) into itself repeatedly toward time t, ܴ௅,௧ା௦,௘  is represented as 
a linear function of ሺܴ௧ା௦ିଵ, ܴ௧ା௦ିଶ, … , ܴ௧	, ܴ௅,௧௘ ), and then substituting it into Eq. (19) and 
re-parametrizing, we can get 
 
    lnሺܭ௜௧ା்ሻ െ lnሺܭ௜௧ሻ ൌ ∑ ߚ௦ܴ௜௧ା௦்ିଵ௦ୀ଴ ൅ ߚ௅ܴ௅,௜௧,௘ ൅ ݔ௜௧γ ൅ ݑ௜   (21), 
 
where ݑ௜ ൌ ∑ ݁௜,௧ା௦்ିଵ௦ୀ଴ .To deal with data-censoring problems due to firm exits, I 
approximated the LHS with ܫ௜௧ା் ܭ௜௧⁄ ൌ ሺܭ௜௧ା்೔ െ ܭ௜௧ሻ ܭ௜௧⁄ , where ௜ܶ is ܶ or the year a 
firm i exited, whichever is smaller, and replace the first term in the RHS with ߚௌ ∙ തܴௌ,௜, 
where തܴௌ,௜ ൌ ሺ ௜ܶି ଵ ∑ ܴ௜௧ା௦்೔ିଵ௦ୀ଴ ሻ is the average of the short-term return on investment 
from year t until the year ௜ܶ െ 1. Since ܴ௅,௜௧,௘  is unobservable, I used its indicator, ܫሾܴ௅,௜௧,௘ ሿ, 
defined later. Finally, adding lnሺܭ௜௧ሻ to the RHS to capture the partial adjustment, I 
employed the following cross-sectional Tobit model as an estimated equation. 
 
    ܫ௜்ାଵ ോ ܭ௜௧ ൌ max	ሾ	െ1, ߙ lnሺܭ௜௧ሻ ൅ ߚௌ തܴௌ,௜ ൅ ߚ௅ܫሾܴ௅,௜௧,௘ ሿ ൅ ݔ௜௧γ ൅ ݑ௜ሿ  (22), 
  ݑ௜หlnሺܭ௜௧ሻ , തܴௌ,௜ , ܴ௅,௜௧௘ , ݔ௜௧		~		Normalሺ0, ߪ௨ଶሻ    (23). 
 
  ܫሾܴ௅,௜௧,௘ ሿ is derived as follows. Consider the situation where a firm i makes a decision at 
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time t about whether to apply to the voluntary disposal after the compulsory disposal. A 
firm increases the amounts of disposal by an additional one spindle by comparing ௏ܲ, 
which is the purchasing price for the voluntary disposal, with ܴ௅,௜௧,௘  that a firm expects 
this additional 1 spindle would make thereafter. Consequently, the amounts of disposal 
is chosen at the level where ௏ܲ is equal to the expected value of the long-term return 
from the last spindle that a firm took out, which is equal to ܴ௅,௜௧,௘  right after the application 
periods expires. In this context, the following relationship holds: ௏ܲ ൌ ܴ௅,௜௧,௘  if a firm joins 
the voluntary disposal, but ௏ܲ ൏ ܴ௅,௜௧,௘  if a firm does not. Therefore, the absence or 
presence of voluntary disposal can work as the indicator on the level of ܴ௅,௜௧,௘ . In other 
words, the higher 	ܴ௅,௜௧,௘  a firm has, the less it is likely to apply to the voluntary disposal. 
Define the indicator variable: 
 
  ܫሾܴ௅,௜௧,௘ ሿ = 1 if a firm participated in the voluntary disposal, otherwise 0, 
 
which is a nonlinear function of ܴ௅,௜௧,௘  and negatively correlated with it. 
 
Data and definition of variables 
  The sources of data are the same as the previous subsection. To examine the 
persistence of policy effect, I used three different lengths of the measurement period of 
the investment, from the end of 1969 until the end of 1970, 1971 or 1972. ܭ௜௧ is the 
number of spinning machines at the end of 1969, and ܫ௜௧ାଵ is defined as the change in 
ܭ௜௧ from the end of 1969 until the end of the last year in each period, or the year a firm 
exited, whichever is smaller. I also used two states of capital stock (operable, and 
operable plus non-operable) to examine the difference in policy effects. The expected 
sign of coefficient of lnሺܭ௜௧ሻ  is ambiguous due to the competing powers explained 
previously. തܴௌ,௜ is defined as the average of the logarithm of real ݌݉݌݇௧ (defined in 
section 3) from 1969 until the second last year in each period, or the previous year before 
a firm exited, whichever is smaller. This variable is renamed avg. lnሺ݌݉݌݇ሻ for simplicity. 
ݔ௜௧  contains (ݓ݁ܽݐݓ݅௜௧ , ݐݔ݌ݎ௜௧ , ݌ݎܿݏ௜௧ , ݉ݎ݃௜௧ , ݀ܿ݉௜௧), which has been defined in the 
previous subsection, and here measured as the beginning of 197029. 
 As for ܫሾܴ௅,௜௧,௘ ሿ, since the number of registered machines is available as policy variable, 
ܫሾܴ௅,௜௧,௘ ሿ is calculated defined as follows. 
 
ܫሾܴ௅,௜௧,௘ ሿ is equal to 1 if the number of spindles of the registered spinning machines 
                                                  
29 I also used ݀ݒݎݐݕ௜௧, ݂݂݈ܽݐ݁௜௧ and ݂݀݅௜௧, but these coefficients were insignificant in most 
cases and marginally significant in a very few cases. 
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owned by a firm i decreased by strictly more than 6.25% from the end of June 1968 
until the end of June 1969, otherwise 0, 
 
which is renamed ݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜ thereafter. Since all firms were forced to decrease 6.25% by 
the compulsory disposal, 6.25% is the cutting point between participants and non-
participants, and the variable shows the presence or absence of voluntary disposal30. 
The expected sign of its coefficient is negative since it negatively correlates with ܴ௅,௜௧,௘ . 
Attritions due to other events are treated in the same manner as the previous 
subsection. The number of observation is 100 in the 1969-70 estimation, and 98 in 1969-
71 and 1969-72. Finally, I also tried different types of tests with the Average Treatment 
Effect model proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
 
Estimation results 
  The results are in Table 631. As for operable machines, the estimated coefficient of the 
key variable, ݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜, is negative as expected and significant in all cases (Eq. (6-1o), (6-
2o) and (6-3o)), which means that a firm having participated in voluntary disposal in 
1968-69 invested less during the post-policy period, controlling other factors32. The 
estimated coefficient of another key variable, avg. lnሺ݌݉݌݇ሻ, is positive as expected in 
all cases and turns out to be significant in 1969-72, which suggests that the short-term 
return on investment in subsequent years is also important to make an investment 
decision through revising the expectation. Similar results were obtained in operable plus 
non-operable machines, but the estimated coefficient of ݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜  is smaller and its 
                                                  
30 Although the actual disposal was implemented from October 1968 until March 1969, 
based upon the number of spinning machines as of August 1968, there are several 
evidences that the indicator captures in some extents the participants in voluntary disposal. 
First, the total number of spinning machines in operable units and non-operable units are 
monthly available only in the aggregated level from JSA data, and the percent changes are 
relatively low during the gaps: -1.25% from June till September in 1968, 0.26% from March 
till June in 1969. Second, the estimated number of participants from the indicator are 52 
firms (Judaibo 8, Shinbo 12, and Shinshinbo 32), while the actual number is 66 (8, 13, and 
45, respectively) from JSA (1979). 
Some firms decreased less than 6.35%, possibly due to exemption from compulsory 
disposal mentioned in section 2, but this does not lower reliability of the indicator because 
such firms were reluctant to scrap. 
31 There is no censoring in 1969-70, so I used only the OLS. I used several estimates of 
݌݉݌݇௧ obtained in section 3 but the results were quite similar, so only the results using the 
1965-73 estimates are listed. The OLS results in other periods were also almost the same 
as the Tobit ones, so I suppressed the former ones. 
32 Recall that, in the previous subsection, positive relationship between investment and 
short-term return on investment vanished in 1969 when voluntary disposal was 
implemented (Eq. (4-5oa), (4-5o) and (4-5ra)). This means that the indicator captures 
variation that cannot be explained by the short-term return on investment. 
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significance is a bit lower (Eq. (6-1on), (6-2on) and (6-3on)). 
  Finally, I estimated the average treatment effect model, using the same covariates 
except for perfect regressors (݉ݎ݃௜௧ and ݀ܿ݉௜௧) and ignoring the endogeneity of post-
treatment variables. The regression adjustment estimator was employed, assuming that 
both of the conditional means for the treated group and the control group are linear 
function of the observables. The results are shown at the bottom of Table 6. The ATE 
(average treatment effect) is negative and significant in all cases, but the significance is 
lower in operable plus non-operable machines. The ATT (average treatment effect for 
the treated) is negatively significant only in operable ones. Therefore, we can conclude 
at least that, on average, scrapping policy picked up the losers disinvesting operable 




The main results of this paper are as follows. Although the estimated trend of the 
industry level productivity changed in the mid-1970s, significant parts of productivity 
change in the industry was due to ,not the overall factor, but the unobserved factors 
heterogeneous among firms. The scale of incentive offered by the scrapping policy was 
larger than the estimated short-term return on investment, which suggests that firms 
could make a long-term decision on scrapping. 
As for direct effect on investment under policy implementation, scrapping in 1968-69 
made distortions in a firm’s disinvestment, possibly because a part of disposal was 
implemented under compulsory disposal based on a pro rata basis. Distortions by scrap-
and-build constraint on investment was also observed. On the other hand, such distortion 
could not be observed in 1972-73 scrapping for operable machines. Although I do not 
deny that the result might be caused by using voluntary disposals only, note that the 
coordination between policy authority and the industry and between firms also occurred. 
Once including non-operable machines, however, the distortion was confirmed again. 
This suggests that some firms still held the installed but non-operable machines 
regardless of their profitability even after disposal. That was possibly because the target 
of policy was only operable machines. Firm exits had a considerable role to cut down the 
unprofitable machines with or without scrapping policy in 1966-69 and 1971-73. I could 
not obtain any meaningful results from scrapping in 1978-79. 
                                                  
33 Surprisingly, policy effect in the case of operable machines remained when the 




  In the case of 1968-69, although the total amount of disposals was not partially 
correlated with the short-term return on investment, I confirmed that firms having 
participated in the voluntary disposal still invested less in the post-treatment period, using 
several types of tests. In other word, firms having been picked up by voluntary scrapping 
were actually losers in the post-treatment period. This result is consistent with the 
explanation that a firm’s participation in the voluntary disposal was its revelation of the 
long-term return on investment observable for other firms. Note that this result may 
depend upon the fact the combination of compulsory and voluntary disposal collectively 
generated incentives. Especially since the compulsory disposal was implemented just 
before the voluntary one, and it forced reluctant firms to disinvest, it inevitably affected 
variation of capital profitability among firms. 
I should also note that this paper did not offer quantitative results to examine whether 
the policy offered incentives enough to facilitate industry-wide resource shifts to other 
industries. Considering together several evidence offered by other existing studies, we 
still cannot deny that these skillfully designed policy schemes were, as a whole, far from 
welfare-enhancing. 
  Finally, as for policy evaluation in 1978-79, given the fact that much of the workers in 
the industry were young female and that not a few firms had been located in urban 
neighborhoods, my conjecture is that regional factors, such as land price and 




Appendix 1: Data 
Table A1  Definitions and Sources of unit price 
 Item name Definition Sources 
Outputs:    
௒ܲభ Pure cotton-spun yarn 1 
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ௒ܲభ,మబ ݂݅	ܿ௜ ൑ 20
൛ሺ30 െ ܿ௜ሻ ௒ܲభ,మబ ൅ ሺܿ௜ െ 20ሻ ௒ܲభ,యబൟ/10 ݂݅	20 ൏ ܿ௜ ൑ 30
൛ሺ40 െ ܿ௜ሻ ௒ܲభ,యబ ൅ ሺܿ௜ െ 30ሻ ௒ܲభ,రబൟ/10		݂݅	30 ൏ ܿ௜ ൑ 40
௒ܲభ,రబ ݂݅	40 ൏ ܿ௜
 
 
௒ܲభ,మబ 20-count pure cotton-spun yarn  BOJ. 
௒ܲభ,యబ 30-count pure cotton-spun yarn  BOJ. 
௒ܲభ,రబ 40-count pure cotton-spun yarn  BOJ. 
ܿ௜ Firm i’s average account 2  JSA. 
௒ܲమ Mixed cotton-spun yarn ሺ ௒ܲభ ൅ ௒ܲయሻ ോ 2  
௒ܲయ Pure rayon-spun yarn  BOJ. 
௒ܲర Mixed rayon-spun yarn ሺ ௒ܲభ ൅ ௒ܲయሻ ോ 2  
௒ܲఱ 
Other natural fiber-spun 
yarn 
ሼ ௒ܲభ ൅ ௒ܲయ ൅ ൫ ௒ܲೈభ ൅ ௒ܲೈమ൯/2ሽ ോ 3  
௒ܲೈభ Woolen yarn  BOJ. 
௒ܲೈమ Worsted yarn  BOJ. 
௒ܲల Pure synthetic-spun yarn 
௒ܲలೇ ௒ܹలೇ ൅ ௒ܲలು ௒ܹలು ൅ ௒ܲలಲ ௒ܹలಲ ൅ ௒ܲలೀ ௒ܹలೀ, 
where ௒ܹೕ is the share of sales, defined by unit 
price times quantity. 
 
௒ܲలೇ Pure vinylon-spun yarn  BOJ 
௒ܲలು Pure polyester-spun yarn 3 ሼ ெܲఱሺin 1965ሻ ൈ ௒ܲೇሺin 1965ሻ ോ ெܲరሺin 1965ሻሽ ൈ ܲܫ௒ು  
ܲܫ௒ು 
Polyester-spun yarn (index, 
1965 base year) 
 BOJ 
௒ܲలಲ Pure acrylic-spun yarn 3 ሼ ெܲలሺin 1965ሻ ൈ ௒ܲೇሺin 1965ሻ ോ ெܲరሺin 1965ሻሽ ൈ ܲܫ௒ಲ  
ܲܫ௒ಲ 
Acrylic-spun yarn (index, 
1965 base year) 
 BOJ 
௒ܲలೀ 
Other pure synthetic-spun 
yarn 
ሺ ௒ܲೇ ൅ ௒ܲು ൅ ௒ܲಲሻ/3  
௒ܲళ Mixed synthetic-spun yarn 
௒ܲళೇ ௒ܹళೇ ൅ ௒ܲళು ௒ܹళು ൅ ௒ܲళಲ ௒ܹళಲ ൅ ௒ܲళೀ ௒ܹళೀ, 
where ௒ܹೕ is the share of sales, defined by unit 
price times quantity. 
 
௒ܲళೇ Mixed vinylon-spun yarn ሺ ௒ܲభ ൅ ௒ܲలೇሻ ോ 2  
௒ܲళು Mixed polyester-spun yarn ሺ ௒ܲభ ൅ ௒ܲలುሻ ോ 2  
௒ܲళಲ Mixed acrylic-spun yarn ሺ ௒ܲభ ൅ ௒ܲలಲሻ ോ 2  
௒ܲలೀ 
Other mixed synthetic-spun 
yarn 
ሺ ௒ܲభ ൅ ௒ܲలೀሻ ോ 2  
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௒ܲఴ Cotton waste 4 0.54 ൈ ெܲభ  
௒ܲవ Other fiber waste 4 
0.54 ൈ ሺ ெܲమ ெܹమ ൅ ெܲయ ெܹయ ൅ ெܲర ெܹర ൅ ெܲఱ ெܹఱ 
൅ ெܲల ெܹల ൅ ெܲళ ெܹళ), where ெܹೕ is the share of 
material costs, defined by unit price times quantity. 
 
Material Inputs:   
ெܲభ Raw cotton  BOJ 
ெܲమ Rayon staple  BOJ 
ெܲయ Other natural fibers ሺ ெܲభ ൅ ெܲమ ൅ ெܲೈሻ ോ 3  
ெܲೈ Raw wool  BOJ 
ெܲర Vinylon staple  BOJ 
ெܲఱ Polyester staple  BOJ 
ெܲల Acrylic staple  BOJ 
ெܲళ Other synthetic fibers ሺ ெܲర ൅ ெܲఱ ൅ ெܲలሻ ോ 3  
Notes: 
1. The unit price of pure cotton yarns by count are not available in several years, so I extended their unit price 
in other years by the price index of pure cotton yarns. 
2. The original data of average count are biannual, where each half period value is a 6-month average of count 
in pure cotton-spun yarn, and there are a few data missing in average count. I substituted the other half 
value or the industry’s average of the year for missing values and calculated the average of both half values. 
3. As for pure polyester and acrylic-spun yarn, only price indices are available in this period. I estimated each 
unit price in 1965 as listed above and extend them with each price index. 
4. Unit prices of cotton waste and other fiber waste are not available from BOJ price data. I estimated price 
ratio of cotton waste to raw cotton, based on quantity and value of domestic consumption of each item from 
temporary volume of Census of Manufactures (MITI, 1963). The resulting price ratio is 124.6 (yen/1kg) / 




Appendix 2: Derivation of investment function under scrapping policy 
 
Here I build an economic model of investment decision under both the scrap-and-build 
clause and scraping policy during the late 1960’s and clarify the determinants and 
restrictions on their parameters. Investment decisions under a less complicated policy 
scheme during 1970’s is also examined as one of the nested models. 
Assume that a firm faces the problem of profit-maximization over a couple of time 
periods, the current one and the future one, and further that the latter period consists of 
a finite number of sub-periods. Let t be the index of time period where t = 1 is the current 
period and sub-periods in the future are from t = 2 until T. At the beginning of t = 1, a firm 
holds capital stock, ܭሺ1ሻ, which is the sum of two different states of capital stock, ܭ௢ሺ1ሻ 
and ܭ௦ሺ1ሻ. The former is the number of operable machines while the latter is the number 
of suspended ones, and both are predetermined prior to t = 1, say t = 0, and treated as 
given in t = 1. A firm invests in t = 1 to choose the level of capital stock, ܭ௢ሺ2ሻ and ܭ௦ሺ2ሻ, 
in the future period, but it is assumed, for simplicity, that a firm cannot invest in t=2 and 
thereafter. Let ܫ௢ሺ1ሻ  and ܫ௦ሺ1ሻ  be the amount of investment to the operable and 
suspended machine respectively, then ܫ௢ሺ1ሻ ≡ 	ܭ௢ሺ2ሻ െ	ܭ௢ሺ1ሻ  and ܫ௦ሺ1ሻ ≡ 	ܭ௦ሺ2ሻ െ
	ܭ௦ሺ1ሻ  by definition. Moreover, under the S & B rule, a firm cannot increase the 
suspended machine under the registration system and is required to scrap 2 physical 
units of the existing suspended one to install 1 unit of a new operable machine. This 
constraint implies that ܭ௦ሺ1ሻ put a cap on investment to the operable machines such 
that ܫ௢ሺ1ሻ 	≦ 	ܭ௦ሺ1ሻ 2⁄  and that ܫ௦ሺ1ሻ ൌ െ2	 ∙ ܫ௢ሺ1ሻ if ܫ௢ሺ1ሻ 	≧ 0, and if a firm does not 
decrease ܭ௦ሺ1ሻ for any other reasons. 
As for return on investment, assume that a firm can use the operable machines in 
production during all sub-periods from 2 until T but can only use the suspended machines 
in the last period, T, when those machines become operable due to the abolition of the 
registration system. Let ܴ௧ሺܭ௢ሺݐሻሻ be the gross return on investment to machine actually 
operated at the sub-period t and assume that its marginal return is positive but 
monotonically decreasing in ܭ௢ሺݐሻ: ܴ′௧ ൐ 	0 and ܴ"௧ ൏ 0. The investment cost for an 
operable machine is defined as the sum of the user cost and the adjustment cost. Let 
the former be ܷܥሺ1ሻ ⋅ ܫ௢ሺ1ሻ and the latter φሺܫ௢ሺ1ሻ/ܭ௢ሺ1ሻሻ ⋅ ܫ௢ሺ1ሻ. ܷܥሺ1ሻ is the user 
cost per unit of operable machine, normally depending on the nominal interest rate, the 
physical depreciation rate, the tax rate, and the purchasing and resale prices of machine. 
Assume that Ψሺ∙ሻ is monotonically increasing and convex. Then φᇱ ൐ 	0 and φ"	 ൐ 	0. 
  Under the above settings, a firm’s profit maximization problem is defined as follows. 
36 
 
maxሼூ೚ሽ ܴି்ሾܭ௢ ൅ ܫ௢ሿ ൅	்ܴሾܭ௢ ൅ ܫ௢ ൅ ߤሼܭ௦ െ 2 ⋅ ܫ௢ሽሿ െ ܷܥ ⋅ ܫ௢ െ φሺܫ௢ ܭ௢⁄ ሻ ⋅ ܫ௢ 
subject to ܫ௢ 	≦ 	ܭ௦ 2⁄  (A1), 
where the time scripts are dropped. ܴି்ሾܭ௢ ൅ ܫ௢ሿ ≡ ∑ ܴ௧ሾܭ௢ሺ1ሻ ൅ ܫ௢ሺ1ሻሿ்ିଵ௧ୀଶ , which is the 
sum of the gross return from t = 2 until T-1, and ்ܴሾܭ௢ ൅ ܫ௢ ൅ ߤሼܭ௦ െ 2 ⋅ ܫ௢ሽሿ is the gross 
return in the last sub-period T. Note that the suspended machines is only operated in T 
and ߤ is the obsolesce rate (0	 ≦ ߤ	 ≦ 1) and that the time discount rate is ignored. 
Let the Lagrangian function be ܮ ൌ 	ܴି்ሾܭ௢ ൅ ܫ௢ሿ ൅	்ܴሾܭ௢ ൅ ܫ௢ ൅ ߤሼܭ௦ െ 2ܫ௢ሽሿ െ ܷܥ ⋅
ܫ௢ െ φሺܫ௢ ܭ௢⁄ ሻ ⋅ ܫ௢ ൅	ߣ଴ሺܭ௦ 2⁄ െ	ܫ௢ሻ, Kuhn=Tucker conditions are as follows. 
    ߲ܮ ߲ܫ௢⁄ ൌ ܴᇱି்∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 2ߤሻܴᇱ∗் െ ܷܥ െ ሼφᇱሺ݅௢∗ሻ ⋅ ݅௢∗ ൅ φሺ݅௢∗ሻሽ െ ߣ଴∗ ൌ 0, 
ߣ଴∗ ∙ ሺܭ௦ 2⁄ െ	ܫ଴∗ሻ ൌ 0, ߣ଴∗ ≧ 0, ܭ௦ 2⁄ െ	ܫ଴∗ ≧ 0. 
where ݅௢ ≡ ܫ௢ሺ1ሻ ܭ௢ሺ1ሻ⁄ , and ܴ"ି்		∗  and ܴ"	்	∗ are the second derivative evaluated at ݅௢∗. 
We can easily confirm if the regularity condition and Slater’s condition are satisfied at 
each local point. So given the concavity of ܴ௧ሺ	∙	ሻ and the convexity of φሺ	∙	ሻ, the above 
conditions are sufficient for the optimal solution for some values of ߤ. Then, using the 
monotonicity of φ෥ሺ݅௢ሻ ≡ φᇱሺ݅௢ሻ ⋅ ݅௢ ൅ φሺ݅௢ሻ in ݅௢, we can derive the following equation. 
݅௢∗ ൌ φ෥ିଵሾ	ܴᇱି்∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 2ߤሻܴᇱ∗் െ ܷܥ െ ߣ଴∗ 	ሿ    (A2). 
Two kinds of solutions could occur here. The first case is ߣ଴∗ ൌ 0, where the S & B 
rule’s constraint is not binding. In this case, the optimal level of investment ratio, ݅௢∗, is 
solely determined by Eq. (A2), which shows the sign of the impact of the marginal return 
and the user cost. The second case is ߣ଴∗ ൐ 0, where the constraint is binding and then 
݅௢ ൌ ሺ1 2⁄ ሻ ∙ ܭ௦ ܭ௢⁄ . In this case, inserting this constraint directly into the right hand side 
of the estimated equation can make other factors irrelevant, so I parameterize ߣ଴∗  as a 
function of observable proxies instead34. Linearizing (A2) and the above constraint 
around the optimal solution, ሺ݅௢∗, ߣ௢∗ ) with respect to ሺ݅௢, ܭ௢, ܭ௦, ߣ଴ሻ gives35 
߲ߣ௢ ߲ܭ௢⁄ ൌ ܴ"ି்		∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 2ߤሻܴ"	்	∗ ൅ ሺφ෥′ሺ݅௢∗ሻ ܭ௢⁄ ሻ ⋅ ݅௢∗ 	൐ 0	 
for	sufficiently	small	|ܴ"ି்		∗ |	and	|ሺ1 െ 2ߤሻܴ"	்	∗|, 
                                                  
34 This approach for examining the effects of a binding constraint by parametrizing the 
Lagrange multiplier has been used in several fields of economic research. For example, 
credit constraint in agricultural investment decision (Hubbard and Kashyap, 1992), and 
foreign exchange constraint in import demand (Emran and Shilpi, 1996). 
35 Given small หܴ”ݐ		∗ห for t = 2,..., T, the inequality in the first equation is more likely to hold 
for sufficiently smaller T or sufficiently larger μ, which means that the abolition of the 




߲ߣ௢ ߲ܭ௦⁄ ൌ ሺ1 2⁄ ሻ ∙ ሼܴ"ି்		∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ 2ߤሻܴ"	்	∗ െ φ෥′ሺ݅௢∗ሻ ܭ௢⁄ ሽ ൏ 0. 
 Given the above properties, I propose ߣ଴ ൌ ߣ଴ሺܭ௦ ܭ௢⁄ ሻ as a theoretically consistent 
parameterization of ߣ଴ . Then, ߲ߣ଴ ߲ሺܭ௦ ܭ௢⁄ ሻ⁄ ൏ 0, and, combining it with the sign of 
partial derivatives in Eq. (A2), we have the following restrictions on investment function. 
߲݅଴ ߲ሺܴᇱି் ൅ ሺ1 െ 2ߤሻܴᇱ்ሻ⁄ ൐ 0, ߲݅଴ ߲ܷܥ⁄ ൏ 0,  
           and ߲݅଴ ߲ሺܭ௦ ܭ௢⁄ ሻ⁄ ൌ ߲݅଴ ߲ߣ଴⁄ ∙ ߲ߣ଴ ߲ሺܭ௦ ܭ௢⁄ ሻ⁄ ൐ 0  (A3). 
  The set of inequalities (A3) mean that a firm with higher return, lower user cost or more 
suspended machines invests more. Investment behavior in the absence of the S & B rule 
can also be examined in a case of ߣ଴∗  = 0, where the parameter restrictions on 
determinants are ߲݅଴ ߲ሺܴᇱି் ൅ ܴᇱ்ሻ⁄ ൐ 0 and ߲݅଴ ߲ܷܥ⁄ ൏ 0 only. Finally, since the sum 
of investments to both operable and suspended machines is I ൌ ܫ௢ ൅ ሺെ2ܫ௢ሻ ൌ െܫ௢, the 
investment ratio for total machine is ݅ ≡ I ܭ⁄ ൌ െሺܭ௢ ܭ⁄ ሻ݅௢, where ܭ ≡ ܭ௢ ൅ ܭ௦. Then the 
parameter restrictions are opposite in sign to (A3) in absence of decreases in ܭ௦ሺ1ሻ due 
to other reasons. 
  Next, suppose that scrapping policy is implemented at the end of the current period. 
The policy scheme in the late 1960’s is somewhat complicated and consists of 
compulsory disposals and voluntary ones. In the former scheme, a firm is forced to sell 
and scrap the specified amounts of operable or suspended machines (the	total	is	 തܳ௖) at 
the specified price ( ௖ܲ for operable one and ௖ܲ ∙ ߞ for suspended one, where 0 ≦ ߞ ൏ 1). 
In the latter case, a firm can voluntarily sell and scrap operable or suspended machines 
at the specified price ( ௩ܲ  for operable ones and ௩ܲ ∙ ߞ  for suspended ones, where 
௩ܲ ൐ ௖ܲ). Assuming that a firm cannot expect in advance policy implementation at the 
timing of investment decision in problem (A1), the profit maximization problem a firm 
faces is 
maxሼொ೚,ொ೚೎,ொೞೡሽ
௩ܲሼሺܳ௢ െ ܳ௢௖ሻ ൅ ߞܳ௦௩ሽ ൅ ௖ܲሼܳ௢௖ ൅ ߞሺ തܳ௖ െ ܳ௢௖ሻሽ ൅ ܴି்ൣܭ෩௢ െ ܳ௢൧
				൅்ܴൣܭ෩௢ െ ܳ௢ ൅ ߤ൛ܭ෩௦ െ ሺܳ௦௩ ൅ തܳ௖ െ ܳ௢௖ሻൟ൧ െ φ൫ܳ௢ ܭ෩௢⁄ ൯ ⋅ ܳ௢  
subject to ܳ௢ െ ܳ௢௖ ≧ 0, ܳ௢௖ ≧ 0, ܳ௦௩ ≧ 0, തܳ௖ െ ܳ௢௖ ≧ 0, 
ܭ෩௢ െ ܳ௢ ≧ 0, and ܭ෩௦ െ ሺܳ௦௩ ൅ തܳ௖ െ ܳ௢௖ሻ ≧ 0 (A4), 
where ܳ௢ is the sum of compulsory and voluntary disposal for operable machines, ܳ௢௖ 
is the amount of compulsory disposal for operable ones, and ܳ௦௩  is the amount of 
voluntary disposal for suspended ones. Then ܳ௢ െ ܳ௢௖ ≡ ܳ௢௩ is the amount of voluntary 
disposal for operable ones and തܳ௖ െ ܳ௢௖ ≡ ܳ௦௖ is the amount of compulsory disposal for 
suspended ones. ܭ෩௢ ≡ ܭ௢ ൅ ܫ௢∗ and ܭ෩௦ ≡ ܭ௦ െ 2ܫ௢∗, which are operable and suspended 
capital stock after investment in problem (A1). The incentives offered by the policies are 
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that voluntary disposals are always preferred to compulsory ones ( ௩ܲ ൐ ௖ܲ) although a 
firm is required to scrap തܳ௖ in the latter scheme, and that, under nonlinear pricing to 
different states of machines in each schemes, a slight change in the difference between 
the relative purchasing price of the operable to the suspended (1 ߞ⁄ ) and its relative 
opportunity cost, ሼܴᇱି் ൅ ܴᇱ் ൅ φ෥ሺݍ௢ሻሽ ߤܴᇱ்⁄ , can switch the priority order among two 
states of machines a firm scraps in each scheme, depending on the level of ܭ෩௢ and ܭ෩௦. 
  The Lagrangian of problem (A4) is ܮ ൌ ௩ܲሼሺܳ௢ െ ܳ௢௖ሻ ൅ ߞܳ௦௩ሽ ൅ ௖ܲሼܳ௢௖ ൅ ߞሺ തܳ௖ െ
ܳ௢௖ሻሽ ൅ ܴି்ൣܭ෩௢ െ ܳ௢൧ ൅ ்ܴൣܭ෩௢ െ ܳ௢ ൅ ߤ൛ܭ෩௦ െ ሺܳ௦௩ ൅ തܳ௖ െ ܳ௢௖ሻൟ൧ െ φ൫ܳ௢ ܭ෩௢⁄ ൯ ⋅ ܳ௢ ൅
λଵሺܳ௢ െ ܳ௢௖ሻ ൅ λଶܳ௢௖ ൅ λଷܳ௦௩ ൅ λସሺ തܳ௖ െ ܳ௢௖ሻ ൅ λହ൫ܭ෩௢ െ ܳ௢൯ ൅ λ଺ሼܭ෩௦ െ ሺܳ௦௩ ൅ തܳ௖ െ ܳ௢௖ሻሽ .  
The usual procedure based upon Kuhn=Tucker conditions and comparative statistics 
clarifies the properties of the optimal solution36. First, as long as the total amount of 
disposals for operable ones (ܳ௢ ) is smaller than ܭ෩௢  (λହ ൌ 0ሻ, ܳ௢  is determined by 
߲ܮ ߲ܳ௢⁄ ൌ ௩ܲ െ ܴᇱି்∗ െ ܴᇱ∗் െ ሼφᇱሺݍ௢∗ሻ ⋅ ݍ௢∗ ൅ φሺݍ௢∗ሻሽ ൅ ߣଵ∗ ൌ 0 , where ݍ௢∗ ≡ ܳ௢∗ ܭ෩௢⁄ . 
Inverting it with respect to ݍ௢∗, 
ݍ௢∗ ൌ φ෥ିଵሾ	 ௩ܲ െ ሺܴᇱି்∗ ൅ ܴᇱ∗் ሻ ൅ ߣଵ∗ 	ሿ     (A5), 
which means that if the amount of voluntary disposals for operable machines (ܳ௢௩) is 
positive, it implies λଵ ൌ 0, then a firm with lower return under higher purchasing price 
disposes of more operable ones. Second, if λଵ ൐ 0, which implies ܳ௢௩ ൌ 0, there are 
several patterns of optimal scrapping under subsets of binding constraints. Table A2 
summarizes the patterns satisfying the rank condition under λଵ ൐ 0, λହ ൌ 0, ܭ෩௢ ൐ 0 
and ܭ෩௦ ൐ 0. 
Third, in Table A2, the partial derivatives of ߣଵ∗  with respect to the first two variables 
means that a firm less likely to do voluntary disposal for operable ones under the lower 
௩ܲ or the higher requirement of compulsory disposal (ݍത௖ ≡ തܳ௖ ܭ෩⁄ , where ܭ෩ ≡ ܭ෩௢ ൅ ܭ෩௦). 
Fourth, the signs of partial derivatives of ߣଵ∗  with respect to ܭ෩௢ and ܭ෩௦ differ between 
patterns, which means that, contrary to problem (A1), there is no common and 
theoretically consistent parameterization of ߣଵ∗  capturing the effect of the binding 
constraints in all patterns. Finally, scrapping only under voluntary disposal for operable 
machine in the early 1970’s can also be examined as a nested case in problem (A4) and 
the parameter restrictions are given by (A5) with ߣଵ∗ ൌ 0. 
 
                                                  
36 The objective function in problem (A4) is concave since its Hessian, Hሺܳ௢, ܳ௢௖, ܳ௦௩ሻ, is 
negative semidefinite. The leading principal minors of order 1, 2 and 3 are ܴᇱᇱି்∗ ൅ ܴᇱᇱ்∗ െ
෤߮ ᇱ∗/ܭ෩௢ ൏ 0, ሺܴᇱᇱି்∗ െ ෤߮ ᇱ∗/ܭ෩௢ሻ ∙ ܴᇱᇱ்∗ ൐ 0, and 0, respectively. 
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Table A2  The patterns of scrapping under λଵ ൐ 0 and λହ ൌ 0 
Pattern 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ߣଶ, ߣଷ, ߣସ, 
and ߣ଺ 
ߣଶ ൐ 0, ߣଷ ൐ 0, ߣଶ ൐ 0, ߣଷ ൌ 0, ߣଶ ൐ 0, ߣଷ ൌ 0, ߣଶ ൌ 0, ߣଷ ൐ 0, ߣଶ ൌ 0, ߣଷ ൐ 0, ߣଶ ൌ 0, ߣଷ ൐ 0, 





ܳ௢௩∗ ൌ 0 ܳ௢௩∗ ൌ 0 ܳ௢௩∗ ൌ 0 ܳ௢௩∗ ൌ 0 ܳ௢௩∗ ൌ 0 ܳ௢௩∗ ൌ 0 
ܳ௢௖∗ ൌ 0 ܳ௢௖∗ ൌ 0 ܳ௢௖∗ ൌ 0 0 ≦ ܳ௢௖∗ ≦ തܳ௖ ܳ௢௖∗ ൌ തܳ௖ െ ܭ෩௦ ܳ௢௖∗ ൌ തܳ௖ 
ܳ௦௩∗ ൌ 0 0 ≦ ܳ௦௩∗ ≦ ܭ෩௦ െ തܳ௖ ܳ௦௩∗ ൌ ܭ෩௦ െ തܳ௖ ܳ௦௩∗ ൌ 0 ܳ௦௩∗ ൌ 0 ܳ௦௩∗ ൌ 0 
ܳ௦௖∗ ൌ തܳ௖ ܳ௦௖∗ ൌ തܳ௖ ܳ௦௖∗ ൌ തܳ௖ 0 ≦ ܳ௦௖∗ ≦ ܭ෩௦ ܳ௦௖∗ ൌ ܭ෩௦ ܳ௦௖∗ ൌ 0 
Partial derivatives of ߣଵ∗  
௩ܲ െ1 
െሺ1 െ ߞ ߤ⁄ ሻ ൏ 0 
if ߤ ൐ ߞ െ1 െ1 െ1 െ1 
ݍത௖ െߤܴᇱᇱ்∗ ܭ෩ ൐ 0 0 0 െߤ ቄఓ୼భି୼మ୼భି୼మ ቅ ܴᇱᇱ்
∗ ∙ ܭ෩ ൐ 0  െሾܴ
ᇱᇱି்
∗ ൅ ܴᇱᇱ்∗ െ ෤߮ ᇱ∗/ܭ෩௢ሿ ∙
ܭ෩ ൐ 0  
െሾܴᇱᇱି்∗ ൅ ܴᇱᇱ்∗ െ ෤߮ ᇱ∗/ܭ෩௢ሿ ∙
ܭ෩ ൐ 0  
ܭ෩௢ 
ܴᇱᇱି்∗ ൅ ܴᇱᇱ∗் ሺ1 െ
ݍത௖ሻ ൏ 0  
ܴᇱᇱି்∗ ൏ 0 ܴᇱᇱି்∗ ൅ ܴᇱᇱ∗் ൏ 0 
ߤሾߤሺ1 െ ݍത௖ሻܴᇱᇱି்∗ ܴᇱᇱ்∗ െ
ሼ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߤሻ	ݍ௢∗ െ ߤݍത௖ሽ ∙
ܴᇱᇱ∗் ሺ ෤߮ ᇱ∗ ܭ෩௢⁄ ሻሿ	/ሺΔଵ െ
Δଶሻ ൏ 0  
ሾܴᇱᇱି்∗ ൅ ܴᇱᇱ்∗ ൅ ሺ ෤߮ ᇱ∗/ܭ෩௢ሻ ∙
ሺܭ෩௦/ܭ෩௢ሻሿሺ1 െ ݍത௖ሻ ൐ 0  
if หܴᇱᇱି்∗ ห  and หܴᇱᇱ்∗ ห  are 
sufficiently small. 
ሾܴᇱᇱି்∗ ൅ ܴᇱᇱ்∗ െ ሺ ෤߮ ᇱ∗/ܭ෩௢ሻ ∙
ሺܭ෩௦/ܭ෩௢ሻሼݍത௖/ሺ1 െ ݍത௖ሻሽሿ ∙
ሺ1 െ ݍത௖ሻ ൏ 0  
ܭ෩௦ ߤܴᇱᇱ்∗ ሺ1 െ ݍത௖ሻ ൏ 0 0 0 
ߤ ቄఓ୼భି୼మ୼భି୼మ ቅ ܴ
ᇱᇱ∗் ሺ1 െ ݍത௖ሻ ൏
0  
ሾܴᇱᇱି்∗ ൅ ܴᇱᇱ∗் െ ෤߮ ᇱ∗/ܭ෩௢ሿ ∙
ሺ1 െ ݍത௖ሻ ൏ 0  
െሾܴᇱᇱି்∗ ݍത௖ ൅ ܴᇱᇱ∗் ሺݍത௖ െ
ߤሻ െ ሺ ෤߮ᇱ∗/ܭ෩௢ሻݍത௖ሿ ൐ 0  
if ݍത௖ ൐ ߤ  
Note: (1) ܭ෩ ≡ ܭ෩௢ ൅ ܭ෩௦, ݍത௖ ≡ തܳ௖ ܭ෩⁄ , Δଵ ≡ ܴᇱᇱି்∗ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻܴᇱᇱ்∗ െ ෤߮ ᇱ∗/ܭ෩௢ ൏ 0, and Δଶ ≡ ߤሺ1 െ ߤሻܴᇱᇱ்∗ ൏ 0. 1 െ ሺ1 െ ߤሻ	ݍ௢∗ െ ߤݍത௖ ൐ 0 in pattern 4. 
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Table 1 Activities of JSA Spinning Firms
Number
Periods Cotton Rayon Synthetic. Others Total Female of firms
staple Share
1960-64 492 ( 3.6) 470 3 19 0 8,901 7,746 (0.064) 83 ( 5.92) 86.0 137
65-69 775 ( 6.8) 478 128 167 3 10,188 9,201 (0.084) 100 ( 7.78) 81.6 114
70-74 839 ( 8.7) 466 108 262 2 9,804 9,674 (0.087) 92 ( 9.14) 74.9 97
75-79 686 ( 7.8) 393 66 226 2 - 9,080 (0.076) 61 (11.21) 70.6 88
80-84 691 ( 9.0) 379 63 247 3 - 8,422 (0.082) 44 (15.55) 67.9 77
85-89 612 ( 9.8) 361 56 191 4 - 7,206 (0.085) 34 (18.09) 65.6 63
Unit: thousand tons (output), thousand spindles of spinning machine (capacity), thousand (employee).
Notes: (1) The coverage is only on cotton spinning activity in 1960-64, but, after 1965, extended to other activities  
             including rayon sataple and synthetic fibers spinning activity and used cotton spinning. The nonregistered 
             capactiy also included after 1965.
          (2) Output of spinning yarn is a five-year average of annual output. Each item is the sum of pure and mixed 
             spunyarn, Cotton yarn includes that made of waste cotton.
          (3) Capacity is a five-year average of the year-end spindles of spinning machine. "Operablel" is spindles 
             that can be operational once other inputs in hand. "Total"  is "Operable." plus uninstalled, out of operation, 
             or broken-down machine. Total in 70-74 is three-year average of 1970-72.
          (4) Total number of employee is a five-year average of the month-end number enrolled. The share of female is
             the percentage of female employees in total. 60-64 figure is the share in factory workers and 85-89 figure is 
             a three-year average of 85-87.
          (5) Number of firm is a five-year average of the end of year value.
          (6) Parenthesis in output shows output per firm, and those in other columns show inputs per thousand tons of output.
          (7) - is not available.
Source: tatistics on the Japanese cotton-spinning industry, JSA, various years.
Output of spinning yarn Capacity Employee
Total Operable Total
Table 2   Estimation of production function
periods
Eq. no. (PF-11) (PF-12) (PF-21) (PF-22) (PF-31) (PF-32)
Estimation
Method OLS LP OLS LP OLS LP
Variable
l 0.0876 * 0.1021 ** 0.1541 ** 0.1200 ** 0.0113 0.0622
(0.0507) (0.0505) (0.0628) (0.0592) (0.0722) (0.0616)
e 0.1675 *** 0.1398 *** 0.1447 ** 0.1655 *** 0.1837 ** 0.1547 **
(0.0521) (0.0517) (0.0662) (0.0498) (0.0727) (0.0656)
m 0.7174 *** 0.6788 *** 0.6932 *** 0.6915 *** 0.7706 *** 0.8857 ***
(0.0440) (0.1677) (0.0485) (0.1724) (0.0603) (0.0669)
k -0.0803 ** 0.1082 -0.0943 ** 0.0668 -0.0732 0.1490
(0.0377) (0.1008) (0.0455) (0.0751) (0.0483) (0.1266)
ydum66 0.0029 0.0004 0.0046 -0.0007
(0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0149)
ydum67 0.0422 ** 0.0380 ** 0.0499 ** 0.0409 **
(0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0223) (0.0190)
ydum68 0.0728 *** 0.0712 *** 0.0813 *** 0.0758 ***
(0.0255) (0.0213) (0.0266) (0.0245)
ydum69 0.0691 *** 0.0688 *** 0.0781 *** 0.0704 ***
(0.0224) (0.0200) (0.0243) (0.0173)
ydum70 0.0793 *** 0.0800 *** 0.0915 *** 0.0821 ***
(0.0245) (0.0208) (0.0271) (0.0194)
ydum71 0.0490 0.0500 * 0.0632 ** 0.0562 **
(0.0301) (0.0253) (0.0317) (0.0251)
ydum72 0.0425 0.0323 0.0613 * 0.0386
(0.0324) (0.0249) (0.0339) (0.0256)
ydum73 0.0195 -0.0018 0.0407 -0.0025







ydum77 0.0210 0.0057 -0.0094 0.0040
(0.0501) (0.0421) (0.0205) (0.0205)
ydum78 0.0026 -0.0061 -0.0384 -0.0159
(0.0552) (0.0464) (0.0289) (0.0251)
ydum79 0.0255 0.0169 -0.0173 0.0015
(0.0575) (0.0471) (0.0248) (0.0188)
constant 2.1215 *** 1.8484 *** 2.2310 ***
(0.3955) (0.4363) (0.5639)
No. of obs. 1441 1441 924 924 336 336
No. of firms. 124 124 120 120 94 94
R2 0.9439 - 0.9475 - 0.9357 - 
Test for
returns to
scale (D. F. =










1. In parentheses is an cluster-heteroskedasticity-robust asymptotic standard error in OLS case, whereas there is 
   bootstrapped standard error in LP case. In both cases, each firm is treated as a cluster. ***, ** and * respectively
   indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level by two-tailed test. 
2. The null of test for returns to scale is that the sum of coefficients on l, e, m, and k is equal to one. The Wald test
   statistic is chi squared distributed with 1 degree of freedom. ***, ** and * respectively indicate significance at 1, 5
    and 10 percent level.
3. Identification restrictions in LP estimation are as follows:
      IVs in eq. (PF-12) and (PF-22) : the current year's l, e and k; the 1 year lag of m.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   












































   
   
   
   































































Table 3   Estimation of invesment function: 1966-79, 1966-73, and 1974-79
State of  machine
Time periods
Eq. no. (1-1) (1-2) (1-3) (2-1) (2-2) (2-3) (2-4) (3-1) (3-2) (3-3) (3-4)
Estimation Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Variable
ln(pmpk) 0.0432 *** 0.0366 *** 0.0408 *** 0.0445 *** 0.0460 *** 0.0539 *** 0.0445 *** 0.0382 ** 0.0271 0.0276 0.0080
(0.0124) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0168) (0.0161) (0.0171) (0.0167) (0.0193) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0207)
ln(k) 0.0206 *** 0.0218 *** 0.0216 *** 0.0209 *** 0.0247 *** 0.0234 *** 0.0130 0.0205 *** 0.0170 ** 0.0171 * 0.0082
(0.0051) (0.0055) (0.0061) (0.0066) (0.0069) (0.0075) (0.0081) (0.0079) (0.0086) (0.0103) (0.0117)
weatwi 0.0426 *** 0.0482 ** 0.0398 ** 0.0352 * 0.0369
(0.0149) (0.0198) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0207)
txpr -0.0145 0.0028 -0.0006 -0.0324 -0.0299
(0.0136) (0.0148) (0.0130) (0.0231) (0.0240)
prcs -0.0206 -0.0429 ** -0.0162 0.0138 0.0250
(0.0154) (0.0203) (0.0139) (0.0191) (0.0189)
mrg -0.0114 -0.0091 -0.0365 ** -0.0321 * -0.0245 0.0057 0.0048 0.0003
(0.0185) (0.0167) (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0151) (0.0246) (0.0218) (0.0245)
dcm -0.0406 -0.0450 -0.0140 * 0.0051 0.0133 -0.0588 -0.0747 -0.0586







No. of obs. 1339 1339 1339 815 815 815 744 524 524 524 490
No. of the
uncensored 1312 1312 1312 801 801 801 735 511 511 511 478
No. of the
censored 27 27 27 14 14 14 9 13 13 13 12
No. of firms. 117 117 117 115 115 115 101 93 93 93 86
R-squared                                                                  
Log-likelihood 135.9 183.4 189.3 73.1 93.7 98.7 134.5 70.2 92.3 94.7 91.3
σ 0.2093 *** 0.2018 *** 0.2010 *** 0.2132 *** 0.2078 *** 0.2065 *** 0.1965 *** 0.2002 *** 0.1918 *** 0.1909 *** 0.1900 ***


























Year dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
1. In parentheses are cluster-heteroskedasticity-robust asymptotic standard error in all cases by treating each firm as a cluster. ***, ** and * respectively 
   indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level by two-tailed test. 
2. The estimated coefficient of constant term and year dummies are supressed.
Operable
1966-79 1966-73 1974-79
Table 4   Estimation of invesment function with the interaction terms: 1966-69
State of  machine
Eq. no. (4-1oa) (4-2oa) (4-3oa) (4-4oa) (4-5oa) (4-4o) (4-5o)
Estimation method Tobit Tobit OLS Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Adjusting  the short-
term suspension Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Variable
ln(pmpk) 0.0405 ** 0.0551 ** 0.0296 * 0.0496 ** 0.0668 ** 0.0495 ** 0.0666 **
(0.0198) (0.0260) (0.0158) (0.0201) (0.0260) (0.0207) (0.0266)
ln(pmpk)  * ydum69 -0.0559 ** -0.0652 ** -0.0650 **
(0.0283) (0.0296) (0.0300)
ln(k) 0.0148 ** 0.0177 ** -0.0013 0.0115 0.0132 0.0118 0.0136
(0.0074) (0.0090) (0.0044) (0.0071) (0.0086) (0.0073) (0.0089)
ln(k)  * ydum69 -0.0126 -0.0089 -0.0093
(0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0133)
ks/ko 0.0512 * 0.0551 * 0.0327 0.0437 * 0.0466 ** 0.0399 * 0.0422 *
(0.0270) (0.0283) (0.0231) (0.0232) (0.0230) (0.0238) (0.0237)
ks/ko  * ydum69 -0.0421 -0.0361 -0.0317
(0.0454) (0.0407) (0.0417)
weatwi 0.0302 * 0.0554 *** 0.0697 *** 0.0563 *** 0.0708 ***
(0.0162) (0.0195) (0.0240) (0.0204) (0.0251)
weatwi  * ydum69 -0.0557 * -0.0567 *
(0.0332) (0.0339)
txpr -0.0173 -0.0162 -0.0208 -0.0162 -0.0205
(0.0159) (0.0174) (0.0208) (0.0182) (0.0219)
txpr  * ydum69 0.0116 0.0113
(0.0233) (0.0245)
prcs 0.0073 -0.0202 -0.0266 -0.0233 -0.0303
(0.0124) (0.0251) (0.0301) (0.0273) (0.0329)
prcs  * ydum69 0.0326 0.0363
(0.0326) (0.0353)
mrg -0.0400 ** -0.0197 -0.0121 -0.0301 0.0070 -0.0381 -0.0088
(0.0197) (0.0250) (0.0220) (0.0251) (0.0264) (0.0232) (0.0268)
mrg  * ydum69 -0.0476 -0.0765 ** -0.0607 *
(0.0308) (0.0335) (0.0342)
dcm -0.0378 *** 0.0037 -0.0400 *** -0.0373 0.0067 -0.0357 0.0088
(0.0140) (0.0178) (0.0137) (0.0234) (0.0283) (0.0249) (0.0302)
dcm  * ydum69 -0.1294 *** -0.1430 *** -0.1451 ***
(0.0227) (0.0342) (0.0357)
ydum67 0.0088 0.0086 0.0018 0.0102 0.0103 0.0926 *** 0.0928 ***
(0.0260) (0.0259) (0.0216) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0275) (0.0275)
ydum68 0.0395 0.0372 0.0333 * 0.0383 0.0356 0.0377 0.0351
(0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0196) (0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0248) (0.0246)
ydum69 -0.0256 0.1348 -0.0312 ** -0.0249 0.1244 -0.0255 0.1267
(0.0213) (0.1619) (0.0145) (0.0214) (0.1635) (0.0210) (0.1647)
constant -0.1927 ** -0.2283 ** -0.0168 -0.1861 ** -0.2165 ** -0.1879 ** -0.2191 **
(0.0916) (0.1084) (0.0496) (0.0888) (0.1049) (0.0907) (0.1072)
No. of obs. 429 429 424 429 429 429 429
No. of the 424 424 424 424 424 424 424
No. of the censored 5 5 0 5 5 5 5
No. of firms. 115 115 113 115 115 115 115
R-squared 0.0511
Log-likelihood 128.9 130.1 133.0 135.1 120.9 123.0
σ 0.1740 *** 0.1735 *** 0.1724 *** 0.1715 *** 0.1774 *** 0.1765 ***


















1. In parentheses are cluster-heteroskedasticity-robust asymptotic standard error in all cases by treating each
    firm as a cluster. ***, ** and * respectively indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level by two-tailed test.
2. LP means Levinsohn and Petrin's procedure.
Operable
Table 4   (Continued)
State of  machine
Eq. no. (4-1ra) (4-2ra) (4-3ra) (4-4ra) (4-5ra)
Estimation method Tobit Tobit OLS Tobit Tobit
Adjusting  the short-
term suspension Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Variable
ln(pmpk) 0.0381 * 0.0562 ** 0.0252 0.0453 ** 0.0644 **
(0.0210) (0.0273) (0.0161) (0.0210) (0.0267)
ln(pmpk)  * ydum69 -0.0670 ** -0.0712 **
(0.0297) (0.0309)
ln(k) 0.0135 * 0.0160 * -0.0013 0.0116 0.0133
(0.0075) (0.0088) (0.0038) (0.0071) (0.0084)
ln(k)  * ydum69 -0.0114 -0.0095
(0.0133) (0.0128)
ks/ko -0.1028 ** -0.1117 ** -0.1140 *** -0.1101 *** -0.1190 ***
(0.0448) (0.0458) (0.0434) (0.0401) (0.0405)
ks/ko  * ydum69 0.1028 ** 0.1052 **
(0.0489) (0.0463)
weatwi 0.0257 * 0.0511 *** 0.0589 ***
(0.0137) (0.0180) (0.0213)
weatwi  * ydum69 -0.0336
(0.0319)
txpr -0.0184 -0.0175 -0.0179
(0.0161) (0.0177) (0.0214)
txpr  * ydum69 -0.0034
(0.0280)
prcs -0.0030 -0.0304 -0.0377
(0.0118) (0.0275) (0.0332)
prcs  * ydum69 0.0462
(0.0369)
mrg -0.0259 -0.0357 0.0075 -0.0113 -0.0031
(0.0186) (0.0253) (0.0109) (0.0170) (0.0251)
mrg  * ydum69 0.0101 -0.0263
(0.0314) (0.0314)
dcm -0.0588 *** -0.0296 * -0.0539 *** -0.0516 ** -0.0172
(0.0139) (0.0173) (0.0121) (0.0241) (0.0294)
dcm  * ydum69 -0.0832 *** -0.1154 ***
(0.0229) (0.0357)
ydum67 -0.0226 -0.0217 -0.0305 * -0.0215 -0.0206
(0.0235) (0.0234) (0.0182) (0.0236) (0.0236)
ydum68 0.0048 0.0023 -0.0021 0.0036 0.0007
(0.0238) (0.0236) (0.0178) (0.0237) (0.0236)
ydum69 -0.0594 *** 0.0795 -0.0662 *** -0.0591 *** 0.0739
(0.0192) (0.1574) (0.0105) (0.0193) (0.1591)
constant -0.1507 * -0.1817 * 0.0189 -0.1529 * -0.1799 *
(0.0895) (0.1050) (0.0382) (0.0873) (0.1027)
No. of obs. 429 429 424 429 429
No. of the 424 424 424 424 424
No. of the censored 5 5 0 5 5
No. of firms. 115 115 113 115 115
R-squared 0.1246
Log-likelihood 141.4 143.5 145.3 147.8
σ 0.1689 *** 0.1680 *** 0.1674 *** 0.1664 ***














Table 5   Estimation of invesment function with the interaction terms: 1971-73
State of  machine
Eq. no. (5-1o) (5-2o) (5-3o) (5-4o) (5-1i) (5-2i) (5-3i) (5-4i)
Estimation method Tobit OLS Tobit Tobit Tobit OLS Tobit Tobit
Variable
ln(pmpk) 0.0930 *** 0.0476 ** 0.1030 *** 0.1327 *** 0.0668 * 0.0169 0.0702 * 0.1347 ***
(0.0342) (0.0199) (0.0372) (0.0476) (0.0375) (0.0240) (0.0381) (0.0451)
ln(pmpk)  * ydum73 -0.0997 -0.1917 **
(0.0736) (0.0847)
ln(k) 0.0518 *** 0.0092 0.0542 *** 0.0740 *** 0.0550 *** 0.0141 0.0582 *** 0.0788 ***
(0.0162) (0.0132) (0.0183) (0.0246) (0.0161) (0.0120) (0.0177) (0.0226)
ln(k)  * ydum73 -0.0654 ** -0.0663 *
(0.0327) (0.0386)
weatwi 0.0371 0.0439 0.0522 0.0039 0.0107 0.0223
(0.0361) (0.0453) (0.0558) (0.0232) (0.0360) (0.0428)
weatwi  * ydum73 -0.0310 -0.0357
(0.0907) (0.0841)
txpr -0.0050 0.0276 0.0231 0.0167 0.0471 0.0435
(0.0236) (0.0338) (0.0398) (0.0224) (0.0335) (0.0395)
txpr  * ydum73 -0.0036 -0.0181
(0.0671) (0.0708)
prcs -0.0113 -0.0822 * -0.1195 ** -0.0213 -0.0888 ** -0.1239 **
(0.0211) (0.0453) (0.0559) (0.0185) (0.0448) (0.0518)
prcs  * ydum73 0.1372 ** 0.1445 **
(0.0696) (0.0681)
mrg -0.0607 * -0.0255 -0.0576 ** -0.1079 *** -0.0753 ** -0.0386 ** -0.0710 *** -0.1017 ***
(0.0347) (0.0207) (0.0232) (0.0340) (0.0347) (0.0178) (0.0242) (0.0362)
mrg  * ydum73 0.1560 *** 0.0992 *
(0.0457) (0.0571)
dcm 0.0324 0.0134 0.0848 ** 0.1081 ** 0.0346 0.0367 * 0.1076 ** 0.1209 **
(0.0252) (0.0261) (0.0428) (0.0471) (0.0243) (0.0221) (0.0437) (0.0487)
dcm  * ydum73 -0.0945 -0.0808
(0.0774) (0.0734)
ydum72 -0.0780 ** -0.0456 -0.0777 ** -0.0765 * -0.0652 * -0.0349 -0.0669 * -0.0627 *
(0.0393) (0.0289) (0.0395) (0.0393) (0.0372) (0.0278) (0.0376) (0.0374)
ydum73 -0.1042 *** -0.1033 *** -0.1034 *** 0.6163 * -0.1230 *** -0.1259 *** -0.1262 *** 0.6444
(0.0351) (0.0277) (0.0358) (0.3604) (0.0342) (0.0284) (0.0356) (0.4177)
constant -0.5402 *** -0.0650 -0.5854 *** -0.8035 *** -0.5717 *** -0.0974 -0.6087 *** -0.8552 ***
(0.1857) (0.1302) (0.2015) (0.2628) (0.1862) (0.1283) (0.1996) (0.2477)
No. of obs. 286 277 286 286 286 277 286 286
No. of the
uncensored 277 277 277 277 277 277 277 277
No. of the censored 9 0 9 9 9 0 9 9
No. of firms. 100 98 100 100 100 98 100 100
R-squared 0.0681 0.0846
Log-likelihood -39.0 -37.4 -35.0 -28.2 -26.8 -21.7
σ 0.2629 *** 0.2614 *** 0.2593 *** 0.2526 *** 0.2514 *** 0.2469 ***




















1. In parentheses are cluster-heteroskedasticity-robust asymptotic standard error in all cases by treating each firm as a cluster.
    ***, ** and * respectively indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level by two-tailed test.
2. LP means Levinsohn and Petrin's procedure.
Operable Installed
Table 6  Estimation of investment function with prolicy variable: 1969-72
State of  machine
measurement
period of g (k) 1969-70 1969-71 1969-72 1969-70 1969-71 1969-72
Eq. no. (6-1o) (6-2o) (6-3o) (6-1on) (6-2on) (6-3on)
Estimation OLS Tobit Tobit OLS Tobit Tobit
Variable
avg. ln(pmpk) -0.0297 0.0995 0.2041 * -0.0266 0.1540 * 0.2101 *
(0.0260) (0.0761) (0.1106) (0.0250) (0.0884) (0.1139)
ln(k) 0.0052 0.0230 0.1585 *** 0.0005 0.0138 0.1508 ***
(0.0113) (0.0209) (0.0578) (0.0108) (0.0206) (0.0569)
policy -0.0519 ** -0.1337 ** -0.2151 ** -0.0414 * -0.1200 ** -0.1674 *
(0.0261) (0.0561) (0.0938) (0.0248) (0.0598) (0.0978)
weatwi 0.0168 0.0881 0.1229 0.0136 0.1046 0.1387
(0.0259) (0.0715) (0.1148) (0.0244) (0.0703) (0.1205)
txpr 0.0325 0.1023 0.1721 0.0373 0.1130 0.1519
(0.0271) (0.0689) (0.1083) (0.0279) (0.0720) (0.1077)
prcs -0.0494 * -0.0861 -0.3404 ** -0.0349 -0.0447 -0.3170 **
(0.0291) (0.0519) (0.1515) (0.0296) (0.0523) (0.1481)
mrg -0.0895 -0.1411 ** -0.3461 *** -0.0772 -0.1462 ** -0.3760 ***
(0.0704) (0.0678) (0.1265) (0.0679) (0.0730) (0.1427)
dcm 0.0467 0.1009 0.1658 0.0405 0.0944 0.1190
(0.0287) (0.0627) (0.1403) (0.0288) (0.0700) (0.1383)
constant 0.0085 -0.1892 -1.6444 ** 0.0370 -0.1434 -1.6037 **
(0.1150) (0.2357) (0.6270) (0.1108) (0.2372) (0.6214)
No. of obs. 100 98 98 100 98 98
No. of the
uncensored - 96 91 - 96 91
No. of the
censored - 2 7 - 2 7
R-squared 0.0860 0.0643
Log-likelihood - -13.6 -61.2 - -17.5 -63.9
σ - 0.2682 *** 0.4287 *** - 0.2794 *** 0.4421 ***
(0.0509) (0.0480) (0.0506) (0.0566)
Estimated period
of ln(pmpk) 1965-73 1965-73 1965-73 1965-73 1965-73 1965-73
The estimates by Average Treatment Effect model
No. of the treated 47 47 47 47 47 47
No. of the control 53 51 51 53 51 51
ATE -0.0476 ** -0.1145 ** -0.1838 ** -0.0380 * -0.0974 * -0.1409 *
(0.0222) (0.0485) (0.0792) (0.0212) (0.0514) (0.0832)
ATT -0.0449 * -0.1120 ** -0.1665 ** -0.0356 -0.0882 -0.1238
(0.0246) (0.0543) (0.0745) (0.0241) (0.0591) (0.0771)
1. In parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust asymptotic standard error in all cases. ***, ** and * 
    indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively by two-tailed test. 
2. In each period, measurement periods of g (k), the growth rate of equipment, and the calculation 
    formula of the annual average of ln(pmpk) are as follows.
      1969-70:  g (k) is calculated from the end of 1969 till the end of 1970. The annual average of ln(pmpk)
                     is 1969 value.
      1969-71: g(k) is calculated from the end of 1969 till the end of 1971. The annual average of ln(pmpk)
                    is from 1969 till 1970 or the previous year before a firm exits, whichever is earlier.
      1969-72: g(k) is calculated from the end of 1969 till the end of 1972. The annual average of ln(pmpk)
                    is from 1969 till 1971 or the previous year before a firm exits, whichever is earlier.
Operable Operable + Non-operable
